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Sunday, 26 August 2007

Bogle: 'Hope Will Return'

The stock market continued its volatile run Aug. 16, with the Dow Jones industrials plunging more than 300 points after problems at mortgage lender Countrywide Financial (NYSE:CFC - News) confirmed investors' fears that the worst of the credit crunch isn't over yet. And just as suddenly, major indexes zoomed back in the last hour of trading to finish the day little changed. Amid the scary market action, what's an individual investor to do?

BusinessWeek Associate Editor Emily Thornton asked that very question of John Bogle, founder of the Vanguard Group and a pioneer of index investing. The fund-industry veteran, who recently wrote The Little Book of Common Sense Investing, recommends at least two pieces of sage advice: First, be sure to keep an adequate portion of your portfolio in bonds. Second, try to remain calm: Bogle says it's possible the stock market could slide by another 15-20%.

Edited excerpts from their conversation follow:

We're seeing such problematic credit and stock markets. What do you think individual investors should do?

I would divide individual investors into two classes. If they're speculators, they will be scared and it may get worse and they should probably get out. But I don't feel confident in that advice because I don't give speculators advice!

We clearly have a problem with confidence in the market. Equally clearly, as all market cycles go, we have gone from hope, to greed, and now we're going to fear. Eventually hope will return. And very eventually greed will return. But I think it's going to be a while before we have the kind of greed that we have witnessed in this recent era reappear.

On the other hand, if I was going to give advice to an individual investor -- and I make a very important distinction here -- if they have come into this market and have invested the way people should invest, and that means they have a little bond position if they're young, and an average bond position if they're in their middle years, and a substantial bond position in their retirement years, then I would do absolutely nothing. They will be protected by the fact that bonds are going up and bonds generate income. No one will take that income from them. They should just hang in there and do nothing.

Even if I was pretty confident that the decline will continue -- and I think it's more likely than not -- you've not only got to get out right, you've also got to get in right. You must be right twice. So if you get out now, and the market goes way down another 15 or 20%, which is quite possible, they will be so scared they won't get in. So I'm a stay-the-course person. Personally, I'm about 60% bonds and 40% stocks. I haven't changed a single thing in my portfolio. I'm largely indexed on both sides. I haven't made a significant change in my portfolio in six or seven years. On a day like today, I may be worth as much at the end of the day as I was at the beginning because the bonds are up 1% and the stocks are off 2%-3%.

I'm very comfortable when these things happen. I don't much like them. But on the other hand, we have a system where there has been much too much easy credit and aberrant behavior, with rating agencies giving unbelievably casual high ratings to these mortgage-backed bonds. People are apparently able to collect all the poor bonds that don't have great chances of repayment, put them in a portfolio, and by fooling around, nobody knows exactly how, with the order in which they pay off, they're able to create a portfolio that is 90% triple-A bonds out of a portfolio that is in fact 99% C bonds or mortgages.

You pay a price for all this and we're paying the price now.

Why shouldn't I take all of my money out of all of these bond and stock indexes and just put it in cash or a CD?

First of all, you'll probably end up paying a lot of capital gains taxes. And you might be right. But on the other hand, what are you going to do next? A good bit of this decline has occurred. If you could get out and get into CDs when the market was 10% higher than it is now, that would have been a nice thing to have done. But people weren't thinking that way then. You're always bullish at the highs and bearish on the way down. So you're buying at the highs and selling at the lows. What sense does that make? I would say never do 100% of anything. An intelligent investor might take 20% out of his stock position, wait a week, and see what happens. But with these wholesale changes, you're going to get whipsawed. You're going to be in cash and the market is going to come back, and then you'll pay a higher price to get in than you got out today.

It's not a good idea to time the market. In the long run, investing is not about markets at all. Investing is about enjoying the returns earned by businesses. And the stock market is nothing but a giant distraction in that quest to acquire returns that business earns. It overmagnifies everything. Investors get scared. Their advisors get scared. And you get exactly what we're having -- a bit of a mess.

How would you compare today's troubles, which are more credit-driven than stock market-driven?

You know the old saying that all happy families are alike, but all unhappy families are unhappy in their own way? The same conditions never prevail from one market to another one. This is rather serious. We know we have a world that operates on credit. Too much credit and too loose credit. So we have a price to pay for getting too irrationally exuberant.

Why wouldn't you be surprised if the stock market dropped another 15%?

The market takes on a certain momentum and it could happen. I didn't say it would happen. I said it could happen. In a stock market, believe me, anything can happen! Confidence changes. You measure confidence by the price-to-earnings multiple and it's probably gone from 18 to 16 here, down about 10%. The long-term average is around 15.

I'm an observer of this. I don't know what to do myself. But I don't feel any need. I doubt I will change my stock-bond ratio for the rest of my days.

Some people are saying we could see a repeat of what happened to the stock market in 1987. Do you think that's the case?

1987 was nothing, really. Think about it. In a short period -- one day -- it was pretty much all over. The market went down a little less than 25%. But by the end of the year, it was up 3%. 1987 was an up year in the market. I don't think this one will be. But if people are saying that it could be like 1987, they should pray that it is!

Are you surprised that even money-market mutual funds have been affected by this credit mess?

Not the money-market mutual funds as such. It's the ones that offer you a higher yield. Money-market funds, as far as I know, every one is still valued at a dollar. But in this business, everybody is always trying to sell you something. If money-market yields are low, then (they say) here's a money-market fund where you have a yield that's more. How do you have more? You buy lower quality paper. This is not complicated. And you pay a price. When people are gambling in their money-market fund, they've got to be very foolish.

I'm an indexer. I own the market. And I'm happy. Markets come and go. In my book, I use a quotation that I stole from Shakespeare. A day in movements of the market are like "a tale told by an idiot -- full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." I'll say this seems to be signifying a final, at long last, reversal of the easy credit, and the sloppy credit analysis, that has characterized the recent era.


By Definition, We Remain in a Downtrend

A few concise answers to your questions:

As far as your money market funds, they all invest in different ways. You should call the manager and find out if they own any paper tied to subprime lending. So far, I have not seen any problems but as you know, ghosts can come out of the closet.

The HOUSING business is in the 2nd or maybe 3rd inning of its downtrend. I find it amazing that calls for a bottom continue. Who do these people think they are kidding? It does not have to end in a crash. My thinking has been that we would have a slow bleed over time as prices have to come down in order for inventories to come down. As far as Miami, forget it. I will be looking to buy a few condos for $7,900 in a few years as the maniacs are putting up another 20,000 units in the middle of a condo depression in South Florida.

The FED did what they are NOT supposed to do...their move was purely to lift the market. How do I know? They made the move on option's expiration day...forcing the hands of the shorts and the puts. Why not wait until Monday? It is now scary that the Fed is trying to game the markets. This move was not to help Aunt Mary and Uncle Bob...it was to help the hedge funds that were getting massive redemptions...in order to prevent a meltdown.

Yes...I saw that action on Thursday and yes, the move off the Fed cut started Thursday...not Friday morning. Why do I say that? Simple! There was massive illegal insider trading on Thursday...but no one will get caught because as usual, no one is watching. The evidence: out of nowhere, FINANCIALS were bought in big blocks...and the Fed struck the next morning. I would love to hear the tapes of the Bernanke/Paulson phone calls before the rate cut. THE NEWS WAS LEAKED...CASE CLOSED! Do you think anyone is going to audit the "out of nowhere" massive FINANCIAL stock buying? Doubt it! Even people that are not skeptical have to raise their eyebrows at Thursday's action. Did you notice that on Friday, there was not a shred of bad news announced by anyone? HMMMM!

The rate cut is meaningless. Nobody borrows through the discount window. It was a move to stir the markets...that's it. The move actually hurt the economy because the 10 year yield was up sharply.

The FED now has ammo with the Fed funds rate. They WILL lower rates...but only IF stock markets continue to get hit. They are more worried about a financial meltdown brought on by Alan Grenspan, lenders, investment bankers and the hedge funds than the economy. I have told you for months this Fed was just plain stupid and just reactive to the news. They are not proactive and never get in front of any problems. Now...finally...finally, they admit there are problems. I highly doubt we will ever hear the word "contained" again. This, just 2 days after the Fed said they would only cut rates in the event of a "calamity."

If I was short, I would be scared every night going to sleep because you won't know if the FED will cut rates the next morning. The hint: watch for a rate cut after the next big down day in the market.

The charts are horrible. If this market is going to go higher, there will be a whole lot of repairing to do first. Now that the market has had a 600 point pop...I suspect we get some backing and filling. I am doubtful we can get a V-like move up...but with the FED throwing money out of airplanes, I recognize anything can happen.

Barron's got it all wrong. It is not about someone's performance when giving out 3,000 stock picks on TV. It is the fact that anyone in their right mind believes that being touted on 3,000 stock picks could provide any value whatsoever.

I do not think this economy is in recession. I believe many areas of the economy are in recession. If we are indeed in a recession, the market will snuff it out and start another leg down.

No...this market has not had a follow-through day yet...so by definition, we remain in a downtrend.

Yes...the Mets are starting to open up a lead in the East. OK...shut up Gary.

Gary Kaltbaum

How You Can Survive The Correction

Paul Katzeff

The sell-off hurts. The S&P 500 was off about 7% from its July 19 intraday high through Monday's close.

That leaves the big-cap index up a scant 1.92% for the entire year.

So we're in a wrenching correction. The sparks for this conflagration are the credit crunch and fallout from the subprime meltdown.

Many investors have been wondering if they should bail out of the market -- before their accounts dwindle further. Should they go to cash?

The question is especially urgent for people near retirement.

The trouble with exiting is that the medicine is often worse than the ailment.

People don't get back into the market in time. As a result, they miss the start of the next rally. That means they lose a big chunk of gains.

"If you're getting hurt by this downturn, it means you weren't able to foresee the sell-off," said Stuart Ritter, a financial planner at T. Rowe Price. "What makes you think you'd be any better at foreseeing the start of the next rally?"

In fact, growth you miss out on is a bigger loss than whatever setback you suffer in a downturn, says Ritter.

Still, investors obsess over how much they lose from a market peak. They overlook their long-term gains, he says.

Market timing makes more sense with individual stocks. Three out of four stocks move in the same direction as the market. And a stock can dart way above or way below the market average. Failing to trade in step with the market can be ruinous to those not committed to keeping losses small. A stock can take many months to come back from a plunge, or never recover at all.

But risks shift with a broad portfolio of stocks. Just as the stock market has recovered from every bear market, so do stock funds diversified across several industries.

The average bear market has taken the Dow industrials down 31% and has lasted 13 months, according to the Stock Trader's Almanac. From bottoms, it has always marched on to new highs.

Buy And Hold

So with funds you should focus less on protecting your capital from sell-offs and more on not missing gains that the next uptrend brings.

Look what happened to investors who were out of the market on days it scored its biggest gains from 1969 through 2001, a period of 8,100 trading days.

If they missed out on just the 10 best days in that time, $10,000 they invested at the outset grew to $74,000, according to T. Rowe Price. If they missed the 40 best days, their end balance was $24,900.

But if they had stayed in the market through its ups and downs, their end balance would have been $124,700.

Some studies show that missing the worst days can provide an even better return than making sure you're in on the best days. But the kind of risk is the same. If you're wrong or get whipsawed in and out of the market during volatile times, you miss big chunks of uptrends. You may end up buying high and selling low.

"Unfortunately, people get shook up by short-term volatility," Ritter said. "Too many of them think they're better off if they try to dodge short-term ups and downs."

A buy-and-hold strategy works better. Take the 50 years that ended Dec. 31, 2006. If you stayed invested in stocks in the S&P 500 during any 10-year period in that half-century, the worst you would have done was gain an average annual 1.2%.

In the most lucrative 10 years, your annual gain would have averaged 19.2%. That was the decade through 2006. The average annual gain was 11.3% for an all-stock portfolio.

Time is on the side of long-term investors. The average bull market has taken the Dow up 84.6% and lasted nearly 25 months.

But what's the best course of action for someone near retirement?

Don't put money you'll need to spend soon into stocks, Ritter says. "Money you need within two years should be put into a money market fund, not stocks," he said. "Return is lower, but so is volatility."

Money you don't need right away should be allowed to grow.

"We tell people to plan to live 30 years in retirement," Ritter said.

Has Market Turmoil Shattered the Investing Rules?

By Gregg Wolper

The past month's stock-market gyrations seem to have everyone on edge. If you've managed to remain calm, congratulations--that's the way to succeed as a long-term investor. If you've been shaken, that's understandable, too. It's tough not to be, given the drumbeat of dramatic news reports about collapsing mortgage firms and 200-point drops in the Dow.

Even more unnerving than the stock market's slide itself is the notion that the recent turmoil has taken an unprecedented and completely unexpected turn. From several fronts we've heard that the markets are behaving in strange, wild ways. The implication: All the assumptions previously underpinning standard investment theory have gone up in smoke.

For example, the manager of a long-short fund, which is designed to handle all sorts of market conditions, explained in The Wall Street Journal his fund's unimpressive showing by saying recent events were "an anomaly." In a Financial Times article, Lehman Brothers explained that its computer models were "behaving in the opposite way we would predict and have seen and tested for over long periods." Later, that same article noted that the computer models running an institutional Goldman Sachs fund had called the confluence of market events so unusual it could happen only once every 100,000 years.

Similarly, according to The Wall Street Journal, some managers "said they were surprised the sell-off was spread so widely across various sectors of the market--from stocks to bonds, to commodities such as gold--which usually tend not to move in tandem. The correlation meant that no matter where they had invested, they would take a hit."

Scary stuff, no? Panic might indeed be called for if every sector was, in fact, behaving in new and irrational ways, and if there truly was no place to hide. Fortunately, neither of those claims is true.

I don't doubt that shocking, unprecedented things have happened to mortgage-bond traders or others at the immediate center of the storm. But it's important to note that the investments favored by the masses generally have performed just as one would expect--and that most time-tested investing tenets remain intact.

Moreover, hiding places weren't hard to find.

Safe Haven?
Bonds don't always provide shelter when stocks are falling. Bonds (even Treasury securities) and stocks can decline in value simultaneously, most commonly during periods of sharply rising interest rates. In such periods, the rising rates make the coupon payments on existing high-quality bonds less valuable, sending the bonds' prices down. Meanwhile, those same rising rates increase the cost for businesses that must borrow in order to invest, and they make it less likely consumers will borrow in order to spend. As a result, stocks can fall as well.

Even at such times, though, bonds typically suffer milder losses than stocks. More important, in many other situations higher-quality bonds actually rise when stocks fall, as frightened investors overloaded in equities turn toward alternatives they consider less risky.

The managers' statements above would seem to indicate that this standard relationship had disappeared. But bond-fund investors know better. Over the one-month period through August 16, while every one of Morningstar's diversified stock-fund categories, domestic or international, suffered painful losses of at least 7.7%, the long-government bond category gained more than 2%. The intermediate bond group (the biggest bond-fund category, which includes core corporate-bond funds) and intermediate government category also landed in positive territory, posting gains of more than 1% each.

In other words, investors who had bought straightforward bond funds for protection against a stock-market swoon got exactly what they hoped for.

Keeping Their Balance
How about old-fashioned balanced funds--those that split their investments between stocks and bonds? And target-date funds, the newest of balanced-type offerings, which have taken the fund world by storm? These, too, behaved as one would have expected over the past month. The conservative-allocation category (funds that own a mix of stocks and bonds but tilt more toward bonds) lost just 3.5% on average over the month-long period. The funds we classify as moderate-allocation, which have higher stock allocations, also provided the expected results under the circumstances. They lost more than their conservative cousins--down 6.4%--but less than any of the diversified stock categories.

The reassuring patterns go further. The target-date funds designed for the youngest investors are the most aggressive, and those geared for older investors are the most conservative. So you'd expect the former to have suffered the worst losses and the latter to have held up best--and for all of these funds to have fared better than all-stock funds. (That's because these portfolios tend to include bonds and cash in addition to stocks.) Sure enough, the groups' results over the past month fit that pattern almost exactly. Those funds targeting 2000 through 2014 lost a little more than 4% on average, the middle range of target funds lost a bit more, and those aiming for 2030 and beyond lost the most but still outperformed nearly all the pure-stock categories.

High-yield bonds also behaved as theory would have it. Conventional investment wisdom holds that the prices of such "junk" bonds, which have below-investment-grade ratings, should behave partly like high-quality bonds, which respond primarily to interest-rate movements, and partly like stocks, in that the changing outlook for the particular company or sector has a substantial effect on the price. And over the past month, the high-yield category lost 3.6%, one of the weakest showings among the bond categories but far better than any stock category.

The Other Extreme
So much for those funds that were supposed to hold up fairly well. How about the other end of the spectrum? Conventional wisdom states that in exchange for their higher potential gains, emerging-markets funds also pose a greater risk of loss than do foreign funds that focus on developed markets. That goes double when such funds have been on a heated rally for years, as they've been since 2003.

So what happened this time? Over the past month, emerging-markets funds suffered the worst losses of any Morningstar categories, with diversified emerging-markets funds losing more than 16% and the Latin America category plummeting roughly 21%.

Don't Rip 'Em Up
Not every type of fund reacted in expected ways. As Russel Kinnel explained in a Fund Spy column last week, some ultrashort-bond funds performed much more poorly than most would have predicted. Precious-metals funds sank sharply. Surprises could be found in certain other corners of the investment world as well, especially in the more esoteric realms explored by quantitative hedge funds and the like. By and large, though, true surprises in more standard areas were much less common than the startling media reports would lead one to believe.

Of course, such reassurance only goes so far. Even if your bond funds held up well, it's no fun watching your stock funds fall. But we can at least take comfort in the fact that we need not rip up those investing guidebooks just yet.


Concentrate On A Few Winning Stocks

Marie Beerens

Most portfolio management theories claim that diversifying your portfolio is important to limit losses.

But a portfolio is hard to manage when it holds more than a few stocks.

"The more you diversify, the less you know about any one area," IBD Chairman and Founder William O'Neil wrote in his book, "How to Make Money in Stocks."

"The best results are usually achieved through concentration, by putting your eggs in a few baskets you know well and watch very carefully," he said.

If you have too much on your plate, you may miss warning signs on some stocks that may have peaked or are giving back profits.

So, what's a reasonable number of stocks to own in one's portfolio? If you have $10,000 to invest, two or three will do the trick. With $25,000, you can expand that to three or four. Even if you have $100,000 or more, five or six stocks should be sufficient.

If you see a stock that you think has strong potential, consider getting rid of your weaker performers and use the cash to buy it.

If you notice that one of your stocks is doing well, add shares to it when a secondary buying opportunity comes up. This can be when the stock rebounds from a first or second pullback to its 10-week moving average or while it's still within 5% of a proper buy point.

When you keep track of only a few stocks, you'll have a better grip on their price-volume action, current news and potential sell signals. Then, you can keep a watch list of other candidates if you need to swap stocks.

In the current market correction, it's best to wait on the sidelines. You can build a list of stocks you like to get them when the market finally rallies. It's better to have a few winners than a large portfolio of average or underperforming stocks.

Social Networking Hits Investing

By David Bogoslaw

For most equity investors, the wild market volatility of the past few weeks has been cause for gritted teeth and palpitating hearts. But a few who have become active in online trading communities took some solace in the fact that they at least had found a place where they can see how other investors are riding out the storm.

"Just the fact that I'm seeing people in there buying calls (an equity option that bets on rising prices) and common stock has definitely given me confidence that the individual is buying on the dip, which is basically what I do, and it's always good to get some reassurance that other people are doing the same thing," says Jim Collins, who opened an account at TradeKing.com in January.

Like many other parts of the Internet, online trading sites are more and more turning into collaborative experiences. Only one of the better-established discount online brokers, E*Trade Financial (NasdaqGS:ETFC - News), has made a foray into collaborative Web 2.0 capabilities with its acquisition of investment community Web site ClearStation in 1999, but a handful of newer brokers have made social networking a cornerstone of their platforms.

Getting Personal

Incorporating social media, or social networking, features such as message boards, blogs, live chat rooms, and podcasts works to the mutual advantage of both brokerages and their customers, says Brian O'Malley, a senior associate in the Menlo Park (Calif.) office of Battery Ventures Partners, a Boston venture capital firm that invests in emerging technology companies. Customers want guarantees that they're getting credible information from trustworthy sources, and brokerages realize their business will suffer if they can't ensure the legitimacy of the information and users on their Web sites.

The rise of trading sites centered on social media is seen by some as part of a backlash against the mass e-mails people used to get from unknown people promoting penny stocks and more often than not looking for a quick pop. But it also reflects growing demand for two-way flows of information.

"We see today's consumers aren't content to sit back and have their entertainment sent to them, or their news or, increasingly, to have financial advice sent to them," says Donato Montanaro Jr., co-founder and chief executive of TradeKing, which launched in December, 2005. "They demand to be part of the conversation that impacts their lives, and we are empowering that conversation." Investors in TradeKing include Battery Ventures Partners, and O'Malley sits on TradeKing's board of directors.

Investors Who Network Trade More

TradeKing allows all of its members to have their own blogs through which they can share investment strategies, or even thoughts about the political landscape that may affect future market conditions. The site's key innovation is its Certified Trades capability, which allows users to reveal what they have bought and sold and at what price.

Montanaro, who cut his teeth on trades as a licensed broker before being put in charge of all online trading at Quick & Reilly in the mid-1990s and founding SureTrade, is convinced the site's social networking features encourage actual trading. Roughly 2,000 to 2,500, or just under 5%, of TradeKing account-holders are really active, either blogging or publishing their trades. "That 5% makes up just over 10% of the site's revenue, so clearly investors who network more trade more," he says.

Customers pay a $4.95 commission for stock and ETF trades, and $4.95, plus 65 cents per contract, for options.For the first 13 months after the launch, there were just over 1,000 people who became really active and stayed active on TradeKing, and that has more than doubled over the past six months. Zecco Trading,, a division of Equinox Securities and part of investment community zecco.com, which launched last October, says it has been adding 1,500 new trading accounts a week for the past few months.

How Safe Are the Sites?

The number of funded and active customers at thinkorswim.com, which launched to its first customers in late 2000, has tripled from about 15,000 to 45,000 over the past 18 months. Granted, compared to the number of people with accounts at established discount online brokers, it's still very early days for the newer trading sites that are betting on the market potential of social networking.

The growing popularity of these sites raises questions, however, about the kinds of protection they offer investors from scams such as "pump and dump" schemes, and what they provide in lieu of suitability rules that registered investment advisers are required to follow. Those rules are meant to ensure that investors stick to appropriate trading strategies that match their financial circumstances.

Montanaro and Mike Massey, the company's director of community development, stress that TradeKing, as a brokerage regulated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), cooperates with regulators and updates them about new features it's thinking about adding to the Web site. Last August, it launched the certified trades function, which allows customers to see what other account-holders who choose to participate are trading, how many shares they're buying or selling, and at what prices. Perhaps more important, the certified trades feature assures customers that TradeKing knows that those participating are real people and has validated their identity.

The Electronic Paper Trail

"We know if someone blogging is the CEO of Whole Foods (NasdaqGS:WFMI - News) and is blogging about Wild Oats (NasdaqGM:OATS - News) and we know that he's got a greater than 5% interest in Whole Foods," Montanaro said, referring to the recent controversy involving the chief of the No. 1 organic supermarket chain. "Being a regulated entity, this would be a really stupid place to perpetrate a scheme because you're creating a trail attached to your name with a regulated entity," he adds.

Massey says his team reviews every blog entry and takes steps to remove comments that can be construed as unethical or potentially harmful to investors. "We try to be as light-handed as possible. In one or two instances, we have removed the user and taken down the content (he posted)," he explained. TradeKing says it has no specific suitability rules beyond the warnings listed under the disclosures and terms and conditions tabs on its site, which customers are supposed to read before opening an account.

Zecco Trading takes it a step further by requiring prospective customers, as part of the application process when opening an account, to fill out a suitability form that lists their investment history, income, experience using various types of financial instruments, and the options strategies they've used in the past. Based on those responses, Zecco Trading assigns each account-holder a specific level of options permission, which he needs to stay within when choosing strategies, says Tim Krause, director of risk management at Zecco Trading.

Something in Common

Zecco.com -- the name stands for zero commission costs -- offers free stock trading through Zecco Trading to customers for their first 10 trades a day and 40 trades a month. Options trades cost $3.50, plus 60 cents per contract. Its biggest revenue source is interest earned on margin borrowing by its customers, says Gabriel Dalporto, Zecco's chief marketing and strategy officer.

Zecco Trading also allows customers to see what other customers are buying and selling as part of the individual user profiles, which also include preferred trading strategies. Users can contact each other and form relationships based on shared stock interests or investment approaches.

For Tom Sosnoss, president of thinkorswim.com, 80% of those transactions are options. It's the very complexity of options, which don't lend themselves to clear black-and-white solutions, that encourages participation in an investor community. Although it has a Web-based platform, most of thinkorswim's functionality is in its software and 95% of its customers use the software, which is free.

Not Another Facebook

Through a sophisticated technology platform that includes live audio, enabling customers to go into separate rooms to discuss a particular strategy, thinkorswim, a unit of Investools (NasdaqGM:SWIM - News) that launched to its first customers in late 2000, emphasizes investor education, which it's confident generates more transactions.

"The thing that intrigues customers is they like to be challenged intellectually," Sosnoss says. "When they're challenged, options traders become a successful community."

But Sosnoss eschews the idea of "social networking," which makes him think of his teenage kids surfing Facebook. He believes the reason people are communicating on thinkorswim.com is to learn how to be more effective traders, not to gain a sense of community for its own sake. "We build trading networks. Really what it is, we build technology that drives domain knowledge. The way you do that is you provide a network for customers to interact with you, as well as with each other," he says.

Listening to the Feedback

But O'Malley at Battery Ventures Partners argues it's hard to start with technology and assume that people will adopt it. "You have to start with well-understood social practices. Then you try to take technology to facilitate those practices and adjust the technology as you roll it out, as you see how people are using the technology," he says. TradeKing has been refining the technology on its Web site since it launched. Many of the new features it will add in mid-September, such as the ability to turn on the certified trades function without revealing the amounts bought or sold, are based on customer feedback on the blogs.

Until now, TradeKing user Jim Collins hasn't used the certified trades feature. "The actual dollar amount is something I'm not comfortable showing, but if they get that functionality (to hide the amounts) up and running, I'm ready to go," he says.

Future innovations that Zecco and TradeKing are working on will allow investors to form groups centered around common stock interests or trading strategies. And farther down the road, TradeKing plans to roll out a tool that allows users to search returns on investment and see which customers have been most successful over time.

One sign of the refuge some nervous investors are taking in online investor communities is the jump in volume of option trading at TradeKing on especially bumpy market days, says Montanaro. "They get some comfort and validation. People enjoy seeing both sides of experiences when markets are especially turbulent," he said. But Montanaro makes it clear that any technological innovations that TradeKing adds will be to drive higher usage and therefore greater profitability.

A Tip From a Friend

Collins, who worked for 10 years on the sell side for brokerages like Lehman Brothers (NYSE:LEH - News) and Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette (since acquired by Credit Suisse (NYSE:CS - News)), said he's been getting investment ideas from people commenting on his blog posts. When he reported an interest in engineering and construction companies and that he had a "huge win" from buying options ahead of Foster Wheeler's (NasdaqGS:FWLT - News) first-quarter earnings, somebody recommended Perini (NYSE:PCR - News) to him.

"(In the second quarter), the earnings went through the moon. I sold it with a 100% gain yesterday," he said. "Without that comment, I probably would never have unearthed Perini. That's a tangible example of an investable idea."

Whether these sites can truly unleash the wisdom of the crowd for market players remains to be seen. But you can bet that in investing, as in other corners of the Web, the urge for community will grow stronger -- and the bigger players in online trading may have to respond to upstarts like TradeKing and Zecco.

Sunday, 19 August 2007

"Stupid" investors, rejoice!

Ben Stein
Economist, writer, lawyer, and actor

No one is too stupid to make money in the stock market. But there are many who are too smart to make money.

To make money, at least in the postwar world, all you have to do is buy the broad indexes domestically--both in the emerging world and in the developed world--and, to throw in a little certainty about your old age, maybe buy some annuities.

To lose money, pretend you're really, really clever, and that by reading financial journalism and watching CNBC, you can outguess the market day by day. Along with that, you must have absolutely no sense of proportion about money and the world at large.

For example, right now we are stewing over what everyone calls "the subprime mess" and going crazy, mourning all day and into the night--falling over ourselves to get all of the misery right, to paraphrase Evita. I'm writing this on Aug. 13, 2007, and in the past four or five weeks, the markets of the U.S. have lost some 7% of their value, or about $1 trillion.

But read on: The subprime mortgage world is about 15% of all mortgages, or $1.5 trillion worth, very roughly. About 10%--approximately $150 billion--is in arrears. Of that, something like half is in default and will likely be seized in foreclosure and sold. That comes to about $75 billion. Roughly half to two-thirds of that will be realized on liquidation, leaving a loss of maybe $37 billion. Not chump change by any means--but one-thirtieth, more or less, of what has been knocked off the stock market.

The "smart" investor nevertheless reads the papers, bails out, heads for the hills, and stocks up on canned foods. He gets a really big charge out of reading in the press that there are also problems in the mergers and acquisitions market and that some deals will not go through because there are problems raising the funds for the deal. He does not see that the total value of the U.S. major stock markets (the Wilshire 5000) is roughly $18 trillion. The value of the deals that have failed in the private equity world is in the tens of billions or less. The loss to investors--what the merger price was compared with the normalized premerger price--is in the billions. It's real money, and I could buy my wife some nice jewelry with it, but it's pennies in the national or global systems.

The "smart" investor also reads that the Fed has injected, say, $100 billion into the banking system in the last week or ten days, and says, "Aha! The whole country is vaporizing. Look how desperate the system is for money!" What he does not see is that the Fed is always either adding or subtracting liquidity and that recent moves are tiny in the context of a nation with a money supply in the range of $12 trillion. No, the "smart" investor is far too busy looking for reasons to run for cover and thinks he can outsmart long-term trends.

The stupid investor knows only a few basic facts: The economy has not had one real depression since 1941, a span of an amazing 66 years. In the roughly 60 rolling-ten-year periods since the end of World War II, the S&P 500's total return has exceeded the return on "risk-free" Treasury long-term bonds in all but four ten-year periods--the ones ending in 1974, 1977, 1978, and 2002. The first three of these were times of seriously flawed monetary policy that allowed stagflation, and the last one was on the heels of the tech crash and the worst peacetime terrorist attack in the history of the Western world.

The inert, lazy, couch potato investor (to use a phrase from my guru, Phil DeMuth, investment manager and friend par excellence) knows that despite wars, inflation, recession, gasoline shortages, housing crashes in various parts of the nation, riots in the streets, and wage-price controls, the S&P 500, with dividends reinvested, has yielded an average ten-year return of 243%, vs. 86% for the highest-grade bonds. That sounds pretty good to him.

The "smart" investor, in a bunker in the Montana wilderness, keeps his money in gold bullion. After all, he's heard that home prices are falling slightly nationwide and a lot in some areas (he ignores areas of rising prices like San Francisco and New York City). He says that this will discourage the consumer and lead to a severe, bottomless recession. He even has bald people on TV telling him he's right to worry.

The stupid investor, the guy who just lies on his couch, knows that the consumer is always about to stop buying and never quite does. Maybe someone in his bowling club has told him there has only been one year since 1959 when consumer spending fell--and that was barely, in 1980. Somehow, if the consumer could keep spending after the bursting of the tech bubble wiped out $7 trillion or so of wealth, maybe the consumer can keep spending even if the subprime "mess" wipes out roughly half of 1% of that tech-bubble loss and the stock market has a fit. And maybe he knows that, even if there is a recession, recessions rarely last more than two quarters, and the economy and the stock market revive mightily after that--and that buying stocks in a recession is a good idea, not a bad idea.

Now, the alert reader may at this point be saying, "Hey, that `stupid' guy who's really smart is a long-term investor. That's why he's doing so well." Correctamundo, alert reader. There used to be a saying: "Bulls make money and bears make money, but hogs get slaughtered." I am not sure that was ever true, but it sure ain't now. The real story is that long-term investors who have some sense of proportion make money. Short-term investors who live and die by the sweep-second hand of the $300,000 watch get rich fast and poor fast and sometimes are slaughtered faster. I have no advice for them except that the next train may be bringing in someone a little younger who's a little faster on the draw and a lot hungrier, so they'd better enjoy their Gulfstream while they have it.

For the rest of us, the stock market is cheap on a price-earnings basis, profits are fabulous, Mrs. Clinton and Mr. Giuliani are far from being socialists and in the long run, both here and abroad, stocks are a lovely place to be. I have no idea what the S&P will be ten days from now, but I am confident it will be a lot higher ten years from now, and for most Americans, that's what we need to think about. The subprime and private equity and hedge fund dogs may bark, but the stock market caravan moves on.

Wednesday, 15 August 2007

Credit contagion

Is the worst over? Fortune's Peter Gumbel offers a 10-point guide to understanding two harrowing weeks - and what's likely to happen next.

PARIS (Fortune) -- Relax! There's really no need to panic! That's the soothing message being put out this week by key players in financial markets after two harrowing weeks in which credit markets in Europe all but dried up, prompting massive injections of funds into the system by the European Central Bank, the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan.
Overnight borrowing rates have come back down after spiking wildly and stock and bond markets have been bouncing back around the world. The European Central Bank, which continued to inject funds into the market on Tuesday, albeit less than one-tenth the amount at the peak of the crisis last week, says that money-market conditions are "normalizing." And Tuen Draaisma, Morgan Stanley's chief European equity strategist, for one, recommended in a note to clients that they should go "overweight" in equities because "we may already be at the point of maximum bearishness and uncertainty, which by definition is the right moment to buy."

So is the worst over? Even the most die-hard optimists concede that it'll take a lot more than a few days of calm to restore confidence among financial institutions and retail investors. "The market is concerned pretty much across the board," says Gerry Rawcliffe, a managing director in the banking group at Fitch Ratings in London.


Here's a 10-point guide to what we know and don't know about the troubles, and what the repercussions are likely to be:


Why did America's subprime mortgage woes have such a big impact on world financial markets?
Because these mortgages were lumped together in packages and sold as asset-backed securities all over the world, particularly in Europe. Often the initial securities were themselves put into new packages, leveraged up and resold as so-called collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). They are a sort of derivative play on the underlying mortgages, just as futures and options are a play on stocks and commodities. Big banks have whole securitization departments who create these instruments. They do so to profit from the difference between the long-term returns these investment vehicles produce and their more plain vanilla short-term borrowing, and to earn fees.


Who bought them?


Everyone, and that's the problem. The CDO market has exploded in recent years: More than $100 billion worth of structured cash CDOs were issued in the fourth quarter of last year alone, according to CreditFlux Data+, a London firm that tracks them (and that doesn't include the even more arcane "synthetic" CDOs). Banks, institutional investors and hedge funds have been the main customers, but some retail investors have also bought into them through the asset-backed securities, or ABS, funds that some of the biggest European banks sell to the public. Everyone who bought these securities was given the same pitch, namely that they were a relatively safe bet, since much of the paper had AAA ratings, but offered higher returns than regular corporate bonds.


So what went wrong?


The number of delinquencies in the U.S. subprime mortgage market has been rising and is now substantially larger than anyone expected - about 14 percent of the total, up from about 10 percent in 2004 and 2005. That means there's a strong likelihood that some of the securities holders, especially those where the underlying mortgages were taken out in the past couple of years, are sitting on losses.


Those troubles have been massively compounded by the aggressive use of leverage in CDO packages. When U.S. blue chip financial players like Bear Stearns and then a variety of European banks began reporting problems, panic quickly gripped the markets. That turned into a vicious circle: These debt instruments have now become impossible to price because nobody wants to buy them any longer. And since they can't be priced, the size of the losses aren't clear, which in turn has given rise to more rumors about financial players in trouble. Banks in continental Europe especially simply stopped lending to one another, which is why the liquidity dried up in the credit markets as a whole and the European Central Bank had to jump in.


How big is the problem, really?


Nobody is quite sure. Patrick Artus, an economist at Natixis in Paris, reckons the total damage inflicted by subprime woes is a relatively manageable $45 billion, which is the difference between the expected rate of mortgage delinquencies and the current much higher rate. Another French bank that is an important player in the derivatives market, Sociéte Générale, reckons that even if things really turn sour, the worst will be losses of about $100 billion. That may sound like a lot, but it's the equivalent of about 1 percent of the total market capitalization of the S&P 500.


Such calculations highlight the real issue here, that the panic has been due more to a collapse of confidence than to any financial cataclysm. "We're still primarily looking at a liquidity crisis rather than a credit or a solvency crisis," says Fitch's Rawcliffe.


Is it really over?


No. The market "remains very, very fragile," says a top executive at one of the leading European banks. Some confidence has been restored into the international banking system and its overnight lending patterns by the big injections of central-bank funds, but nobody has yet dared to start buying that subprime paper in any sizeable quantities. And because there's so little transparency about who is sitting on what size losses, the rumors continue to swirl.
Nouriel Roubini, an economics professor at New York University's Stern School of Business, who has long warned about the risk of financial contagion, reckons some other parts of the U.S. housing market including home equity loans and second mortgages are starting to display what he calls the same "toxic characteristics" as the subprime sector. More optimistically, Neil McLeish, the chief European credit strategist at Morgan Stanley, says that, "we have passed the absolute peak of that anxiety and uncertainty." But even he believes that credit market conditions will be more difficult in the coming months and, "there is still some risk of additional volatility" at least for the next month or so.


Who are the biggest casualties?


Banks and financial market players across the world are starting to come clean about their exposure and losses, partly in order to help restore confidence in the market. The losses incurred by Wall Street titans Bear Stearns (Charts, Fortune 500) and Goldman Sachs (Charts, Fortune 500), which this week announced it is putting $2 billion into one of its hedge funds, have received the most publicity. Outside the United States, firms such as insurer AXA (Charts) and BNP Paribas in France have frozen or shut problem funds, while a range of banks including NIBC of the Netherlands and Commerzbank in Germany have detailed their exposure and expected losses.


The biggest international victim to date is a mid-sized German bank called IKB Deutsche Industriebank that its peers, including a government-owned bank, stepped in to rescue earlier this month, taking over $11 billion of credit lines and putting up a $4.7 billion funding package. IKB had been an aggressive player in the CDO market, through two off-balance sheet firms that it used to pump up its commission income and advisory fees. In the end, its exposure to dodgy securities through these two firms far exceeded the bank's liquidity and equity capital.


Is anyone safe?


Not completely, but barring some huge problem nobody yet knows about, major banks seem in the best position to weather this storm because they have the strongest balance sheets and are able to refinance their operations most easily thanks to the extra liquidity that central banks have put into the market in the past week. "Being a bank and having access to the central bank (credit) windows is key at the moment," says the top European banker.
Hedge funds are another story, as the Goldman Sachs-run one that was bailed out this week shows, although some of these funds foresaw the troubles and have been aggressively shorting the subprime sector and any securities relating to it.


Why didn't central banks cut interest rates in response?


Some critics of the European Central Bank, especially in France, are saying that its interest rate policy, which has consisted of regular rate hikes to counteract inflation, has partly fueled this crisis. "One can ask if the ECB isn't becoming a prisoner of its rate-increase strategy," Thierry Breton, the former French finance minister said this week. But bank economists are generally more supportive and say that the ECB acted smartly with its three consecutive days of huge money-market interventions - the biggest of which was a whopping $130 billion injection last Thursday. "It's a demonstration of the financial system operating as it should," said James Nixon, a London-based economist at France's Société Générale, who says that the troubles primarily affect the financial sector rather than the wider economy.


While the Fed did cut rates in 1998 during the last derivatives meltdown, involving Long Term Capital Management, central banks may not need to this time if markets continue to calm down. Indeed, the big question now is whether the ECB and the Bank of Japan will go ahead and raise rates in the next month, as they had signaled before the crisis. Roubini isn't sure, and thinks that the Fed may well move to reduce U.S. rates quite soon. "The likelihood of a cut in rates is now much higher," he says.


What does this mean for the world economy?


So far, not all that much - but keep your fingers crossed. Growth in Europe and Asia remains buoyant, even if the U.S. outlook is unclear. Some borrowing by companies and individuals is bound to get more expensive as markets adjust and restore a risk premium. But "it's not obvious that the repricing will lead to an economic slowdown," says Société Générale's Nixon, although there's a possibility that Britain's economy, which has thrived because of its heavy dependence on financial services, may be vulnerable. Roubini thinks the United States will bear the brunt of what he sees as an inevitable slowdown of consumer spending related to the housing woes, and reckons that this could ultimately spill over to the global economy if it's sufficiently severe. "The effect on the real economy in the rest of the world depends on whether there's a hard landing in the U.S." he says.


Will there be any regulatory fall out?


This is almost inevitable, especially in Europe where it's now clear that many of the purchasers of these securities didn't fully appreciate the risks they were taking. Look for the first moves to come in Germany, where bank bail-outs are exceedingly rare. The last time a bank got into serious trouble there was in 1974, when the Herstatt Bank collapsed after some disastrous forays into foreign-exchange trading that bear some similarity to IKB's woes. Regulators quickly followed up with an overhaul of the national banking system. It's not clear that IKB's rescue will have the same dramatic repercussions, but it's already prompting tough questions about how a mid-sized bank could end up with such an enormous exposure to risky assets via an off-balance-sheet firm.


"I suspect that at the end of this, regulators will ask themselves if this very rapid expansion (of transactions involving asset-backed securities) has been a good thing for banks, or if the risk comes back to haunt you," says Fitch's Rawcliffe. Watch also for credit agencies to come under pressure to do a better job at assessing the market risk of exotic financial instruments.

Tuesday, 14 August 2007

For Some Consumers, Credit Crunch Ahead

by Andrea Coombes

Mortgage lenders going bankrupt, hedge funds evaporating, the stock market gyrating wildly: What does it all mean for you and me?

There's no denying that the financial markets are on edge and volatile, and some companies are in difficult straits, triggered in large part by rising foreclosures in the subprime market and the effect on investments tied to those mortgage loans.

But the degree to which the current situation affects individual Americans depends a lot on what you've got planned in coming months.

If you'd like to tap into the mortgage market -- buy a house, refinance your mortgage, take a home equity line of credit -- the recent turmoil will directly affect what kind of loan you can get and how much it will cost.


For many borrowers now, "it's more difficult to get a mortgage loan," said Mark Zandi, chief economist with Moody's Economy.com. "You have to have a better credit score, you have to have more equity," he said.

Interest rates are rising on some loans, and lenders are going to demand strong proof of income and employment. "They're doing everything more carefully. They're more circumspect in extending credit," Zandi said.

But if you've got a fixed-rate mortgage, a good job and no plans to make changes, many economists say that the biggest risk to you right now is owning a non-diversified investment portfolio. Despite the worrisome stock-market volatility, the Dow Jones Industrial Average as of Friday afternoon is still well up from its drop in late February.

"We're going to go through a period of disruption in the markets ... but the fundamentals of the stock market have not changed," said Peter Morici, an economist and professor at the University of Maryland's Robert H. Smith School of Business.

"If you already have a mortgage and you can make your payments, you're cool, and if you have an IRA, Keogh or a 401(k), just leave them alone," he said.

But no one can predict the future, and economists vary widely in their outlook, with some saying a recession is nigh and others saying the economy is in for a soft landing.

"Clearly the big worry is that the stock market starts a big, long bear trend. I don't think that's likely because a lot of fundamentals in the U.S. and global economy are still pretty good," said Nariman Behravesh, chief economist with Global Insight in Lexington, Mass.

To investors, "I would say, 'don't panic,'" he said.

Job market hit?

Still, there may be trouble ahead for Americans in other areas.

Thanks in part to the subprime mess, companies are finding it harder to get financing for some deals. Right now, companies are mainly unable to finance their riskiest deals, but if the credit crunch should spread and hit most companies, average Americans may feel the pinch -- in the job market.

"Businesses that can't get credit or have to pay more for capital will be less aggressive in their investment and hiring," Zandi said. "The job market is weakening and I think will weaken further as a result of recent events."

To forestall a credit constriction, central banks in the U.S., European Union and Canada are pumping more money into their systems. "This whole subprime mess is creating a lot of uncertainty," Behravesh said.

"For investors, it's like you're in a minefield. You don't know where the mines are so you freeze up, you stop doing anything." The central banks' money influx is aimed at easing those fears, and if that fails, a move to lower interest rates may be next, he said.

For his part, Zandi notes the economy is still in growth mode, but the rate of growth is slowing. In a note on Thursday, Zandi wrote that "the odds of a recession over the next six to 12 months have risen from one-in-six to one-in-four."

"I do think most everyone will be touched in some way by the meltdown" in various parts of the mortgage market, Zandi said in a telephone interview.

Homeowners who aren't in the market for a loan may still find their home value decreasing as the tightening of credit constricts home sales, and that plus a volatile stock market "could affect a household's wealth and their perception of their wealth and how aggressively they spend."

Mortgage crunch

Homeowners who can afford their mortgage payment can simply sit this turmoil out, some note. But those eager to buy a home or tap home equity are jumping right into it.

The investors who buy mortgage-backed securities are eyeing rising foreclosure rates among subprime and even some "good credit" mortgage borrowers, and responding by refusing to buy loans. That, in turn, means lenders are tightening up their underwriting standards. Only those borrowers who fit certain criteria are likely to find the loans they want.

Plus, if you're hoping to max out your home equity with, say, a second mortgage, your lender might be a little more leery of a high loan-to-value ratio. For homebuyers, gone are the days of getting mortgage loans with just a 5% down payment and no proof of income, economists said.

And if you've got great credit but live in an area where home prices average more than about $417,000, you'll pay higher mortgage rates right now, even as those who borrow smaller loan amounts are enjoying mortgage-rate declines on those loans.

The investors who buy mortgage loans in the secondary market "really drive the bus in terms of what's available in the mortgage market," said Greg McBride, senior financial analyst with Bankrate.com. "Those investors are now pricing for risk to a greater extent than they've done in recent years" and they see greater risk in the larger, or "jumbo" loan area.

The average rate on a 30-year fixed-rate conforming loan -- conforming loans are for less than $417,000 -- dropped to 6.66% while the average rate on jumbo loans rose to 7.35% last week according to Bankrate's survey of 100 banks, pushing the spread between the two rates to 69 basis points, up from 28 basis points in just two weeks.

Prospective home buyers who'll need a jumbo loan may want to sit on the sidelines in hopes those rates ease back a bit.

Meanwhile, homeowners need to ensure they understand the terms of their mortgage loan. "The key is planning ahead," McBride said. "Don't get blindsided by a big payment increase."

Some "prime borrowers are still in the position that they can refinance at attractive fixed rates and avoid the type of huge payment increase that's impacted so many subprime homeowners," he said.

Note that getting a home equity line or loan is going to be "a little bit harder and a lot more expensive. It's going to require some digging by the consumer," said Ron Chicaferro, a Scottsdale, Ariz.-based real-estate industry consultant who recently retired as president of Thornburg Mortgage Home Loans Inc.

Consumers are "going to have to start making phone calls, they're not going to be able to rely on a mortgage broker running around doing this. It'll be working on the Internet, making phone calls to their bank. That's the first place they should start," Chicaferro said.

Investors: 'Don't panic'

What's an investor to do? Many say this is the time to stay put, as long as your portfolio is well-diversified.

"It's a great reminder that volatility is part of the game when it comes to investing," McBride said.

"If your portfolio is invested in tune with your long-term objectives, it's much easier to stomach the short-term volatility, and if your portfolio is out of whack, maybe you decide you don't have the stomach for this kind of volatility," he said. That might mean turning to cash investments. "Money markets and CDs are yielding well over 5%, risk free," McBride said.

Investors should not panic, Behravesh said. "I would urge a little caution. If they're going to move anything, I would say make a few sensible moves into maybe less risky assets, but I definitely would urge people not to panic."

Others say investors should be " risk-averse," said Nouriel Roubini, chairman of Roubini Global Economics in New York. "Try to stay away from risky assets and see whether this is just a temporary thing and see whether the economy is going to slow down or have a hard landing," he said.

"In my view, the real economy has been slowing down for a while and this financial turbulence is going to make the real economy worse," he said.

Even as some are pointing to an opportunity to buy cheaper financials stocks, Roubini says now is not the time, noting that there is still "a high degree of uncertainty of where these [subprime-related] losses are, I think you're going to see financial firms increasingly saying, 'yes, we had exposure,' and there will be losses that are going to emerge day after day that will keep these valuations low and falling," he said.

Un-squeezed credit

The credit squeeze has not spread to other forms of consumer credit. With credit cards, car loans and other consumer credit, McBride said there's been no noticeable change in access to credit or rates.

"You're not likely to see much movement in those rates or restriction to capital without some deterioration in credit quality" -- and that's not happening at this point, he said.

But others see problems ahead, particularly for borrowers who have less-than-perfect credit ratings. "Even in those [credit card and auto-loan] markets you have the process of securitization of these loans," Roubini said.

"You're going to have a credit crunch across any securitization market. That's going to tighten credit conditions for consumers across the board."

That's a squeeze some homeowners are already feeling. Homeowners who "bought at the peak [and] milked every last dollar of equity out of the home, then they could well be upside down," McBride said.

"In that case, lenders won't touch it with a ten foot pole. That's a tough spot and it's not one that has a whole lot of easy answers," McBride said. "If you owe more than your house is worth, good credit or not, lenders will be reluctant help bail you out."

Andrea Coombes is MarketWatch's assistant personal finance editor, based in San Francisco.

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Monday, 13 August 2007

Effect of US subprime crisis could be diluted: analysts

FRANKFURT (AFP) - - The US home loan crisis looks set to continue gripping world markets but the effect could be diluted because the risk is spread among investors around the globe, analysts say.

The European Central Bank pumped 155.85 billion euros (212.98 billion dollars) into the eurozone banking market on Thursday and Friday as central banks across the globe rushed to ward off a global credit crunch linked to the US subprime loan market.

A crunch would make it harder and more expensive for businesses and consumers to get loans and cash.

The potential for instability to spread fast when markets re-open on Monday is high, analysts agreed, but most thought the main bourses would weather the storm.

Gilles Moec, senior economist at Bank of America, said: "One of the big issues is that no-one has any real clue of the amount of subprime loans which have been purchased by foreigners.

"The big question is what is the overall amount and this is bad for the markets because if there is one thing that the markets hate, it is uncertainty."

He said however that there was a paradox -- although there was negative market sentiment, the risk appeared to be spread around the world.

"This shows that the risk is not concentrated in any one place and this is a good thing for the market," Moec said.

Subprime loans are offered at high interest rates to Americans who have a poor credit rating and might otherwise be denied credit.

Andreas Huerkamp, a Commerzbank analyst, predicted the crisis would blow over.

"There are strong parallels with the crisis in the mid-90s so you have to be a brave investor to buy shares at the moment," he said.

"But history shows that everything will be forgotten in six months and the market will recover."

The US Federal Reserve and Japanese central bank had made similar interventions to ensure that the markets continued to function normally, with the Fed injecting 62 billion dollars into the market.

The Frankfurt-based European Central Bank, the guardian of the euro, said its decision to pump money into the market was a "fine tuning" operation.

The "fine tuning" on Thursday had involved injecting 94.8 billion euros, more than the bank had released after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

The cash injections enable commercial banks to borrow from the central bank to satisfy their liquidity needs.

Howard Archer, chief UK and European economist at Global Insight in London, said that if the central banks did their job, the markets should stabilise.

"As long as the central banks succeed in calming markets down, the chances are that the impact of financial market volatility on the real economies should be small," he said.

"Importantly, the underlying fundamentals for the UK and Eurozone economies are still pretty good, so hopefully this will help to limit the overall economic fallout."

Big investors fleeing risk

LONDON (Reuters) -- Big-money institutional investors have turned more risk averse than at any time since August last year, taking positions they typically do not reverse quickly, State Street data showed Friday.

The U.S. financial services firm said its clients, who keep some $13.04 trillion with it as a custodian, have moved into what it called a "safety first" regime.

This is characterized by moving from emerging to developed market equities, embracing bonds and unwinding currency "carry" trades.

Institutional investors tend to take a longer-term view of markets than other investors, so shifts in their strategy can have a significant impact on a market's recovery.

The firm said that since September last year investors had been taking positions reflective either of abundant liquidity or leverage opportunities.

"A quick move back to risk-seeking is unlikely given ... previous history ... and the backdrop of markets," State Street said in a note.

Specifically, the latest data showed risk averse moves such as a sharp fall in demand for emerging Asian equities.

State Street said that a month ago, flows into emerging Asia equities were in the 65th percentile, meaning that they had been larger on only 35 percent of occasions over 10 years.

In the latest data, however, they were in the 5th percentile - almost the lowest level of demand seen since it started collecting data.

Similarly, institutional investors have been unwinding the carry trades in which they have borrowed in low-yield currencies such as the Japanese yen to invest in assets in higher-yielding currencies.

The latest data showed flows into yen rising. A month ago, they were in the 13th percentile. This rose to the 39th percentile in the latest report.

State Street said the risk-averse moves may reflect not just a search for safety but a cashing-in of winning trades.

It also noted that "safety first" was not the most risk-averse regime that it uses to characterize its clients' actions.

That would be what it calls "riot point" and is marked by indiscriminate equity selling.

Saturday, 11 August 2007

ETFs - A Superior Trading and Investment Vehicle

By Doug Tucker

The ETF, or Exchange Traded Fund, has grown from consisting of a handful of broad-based index products, to now consisting of hundreds of products representing almost every conceivable investment theme or idea. Volume has expanded on many of the issues, making them some of the most liquid trading instruments around.

It seems clear that the debate between choosing a traditional mutual fund or an ETF is clearly in the corner of the ETF. ETF fees are much lower than mutual funds, and even factoring in the small brokerage commission applied to an EFT, the savings in fees will make up for the commission many times over. And, some brokerage firms that deal in no load mutual funds will charge a commission to get out if not held a certain length of time. There is no restriction on the holding period of an ETF. And with and ETF you won't get hit with capital gains distributions, so, with the exception of dividends, you get to control when you pay capital gains, short term or long term. You can get in and out during market hours instead of just the close, and there is the ability to easily trade on the short side with most of the active ETFs, with no uptick rule. And there are options available for outright purchases, or for hedging, or for other option strategies. Also, there are ETFs that have leverage, and some that will be inverse to their index, so a long-term short position could have long-term capital gain potential.

The comparison between ETFs and CEFs (closed-end funds) is a bit different. With CEFs, which are somewhat similar to ETFs, you have a security that can trade on its own supply demand; therefore the fund can go to a premium or a discount to its net asset value, sometimes substantially. With CEFs there is also the chance of dilution if the firm wants to issue more stock, usually with an offer for existing shareholders to purchase more shares at a predetermined price. While brokerage commissions will be the same as with an ETF, the management fees will usually be higher with CEFs. CEFs will often target a more specific type of investment, whereas ETFs are usually more broadly index based. However, that has been changing over the last couple of years.

There are more and more ETFs being issued almost daily with very specific objectives. You can find an ETF for almost any country, style, sub-sector, commodity, and even for currencies. There are so many ETFs coming out, it is getting hard to sort through the list. One way to pare down the list is to look at monthly average trading volume. Liquidity is certainly an issue, as some of the newer, narrowly focused ETFs have very low trading volumes, with correspondingly wider bid ask spreads, while the most popular choices are extremely liquid, with a penny or so spread between bid and ask. In time the best will survive, and many too-specific issues will disappear.

In my opinion, some of the too narrowly focused issues defeat the purpose of investing or trading in ETFs.In comparison to individual stocks, there are valid arguments on both sides of the issue. One theory favoring stocks is that you can just pick the best stocks in whatever group or index you are interested in, and not be weighted down by the dogs of the group. That's true. Of course, that depends on you being an excellent stock picker. Roughly 85% of professional, full time mutual fund managers can't beat a benchmark such as the S&P 500. Individual part time investors think they can do better than professionals.

I'm not so sure.It is difficult enough to pick the direction of a market. Much of the movement of a stock will be influenced by the overall market direction. Some say stock movement is about 70% dependent on overall market direction. I can't verify that number as being correct, but it seems in the ballpark. Picking an individual stock on top of picking market direction adds a second variable.

If 70% of a stocks movement is influenced by the overall market, and 85% of professional stock pickers under-perform benchmark stock indexes, it doesn't seem worth the effort to try to sort through the list of thousands of stocks for the small chance of making a larger gain.It is always gratifying to pick a stock that goes up 200% while the overall market is only up 8%. How many stock picks do this? It is easy to fool ourselves into thinking we know something other people don't when we do pick a big winner. But what is the net result of all the stock picks over a period of years.

How many stock picks are down 10% with the market up the same 8%? If you diversify your portfolio, it will probably average out. If you diversity enough, and your stock picking is good, you will probably mirror the indexes. If your have a couple of stinkers in your portfolio then you will probably under-perform the indexes. If you add human emotion and refuse to get out of the stinkers until you break even on those, you might end up severely under-performing the indexes. We all have the same information to work with. It is the information we don't have that will blindside us.

It is only our biases and our opinions on the information that we do have that will influence our trading decisions. And, of course, there is a lot of guessing, as long as we do it with the appearance of authority. Is stock picking with the limited amount of information that we have the best approach?Since most professionals try to beat the indexes and fail, it seems less likely that individual investors can beat the indexes in the long run. So does one have to accept average returns in an index fund if stock picking proves not to provide the desired returns? Not necessarily.

Another approach is to try to beat those returns with a combination of asset allocation and market timing. By not focusing on individual stocks, one is not as concerned with company specific issues such as earnings release dates and guidance disappointments, or with worrying about CEO option backdating, or bookkeeping irregularities, or many other assorted insider problems. Without having to baby-sit a portfolio of individual stocks one can better analyze and assess broader, more accessible issues such as which sectors are trending, which countries are in bull or bear markets, which styles are leading and which are lagging. Superior returns on the more active ETFs can also be enhanced by the use of option strategies which have liquidity and pricing advantages over many individual stocks.

If your stock picking performance over the long run has not kept pace with the main benchmark indexes, you might try picking a small number of active, liquid ETFs representing different sectors of the economy, different countries, different styles. Then concentrate your efforts on that small basket. Try to determine which are trending up and which are trending down. Trade accordingly. Rebalance on a regular basis. You might find you've created your own hedge fund without the high fees.

The Lie That Will Kill Hedge Funds

By Jim Cramer
RealMoney.com Columnist

It's all in the marks.

Unless you have run a hedge fund, you have no idea what that means.

So I will explain it to the uninitiated. When you run a hedge fund, you are always seeking capital. You can seek money directly from institutions or individuals, or you can do the easiest thing and seek money from those who are offering it: "fund of funds" managers who, specifically, look for managers to place other people's monies. This cohort of investors had just gotten started in about my seventh year as a hedge fund manager, and they were always plying me with capital. I tried it for a while, but the ones I had, and they were substantial, demanded too much of my time and, I thought, forced me to make shorter-term decisions than I liked. I valued my independence too much.

So I sent their money back. Lots of people thought that was foolish. Lots wanted to grow their funds gigantically because they figured that was the way to get rich, quick. I was an idealist, and I wanted it to be a like a club where someone had to nominate you to get in. I wanted it that way because I didn't want any heat from them, and as long as I didn't seek them out, I didn't have to worry about pleasing them beyond the numbers. Anyway, few people run money as I did. Maybe none. Most take the fund of funds' money.

Fund of funds managers interview and bracket managers into different groups: high-growth stocks, even-oriented managers, arbitrage, market-neutral, short, long, etc. They put them in buckets and measure them against others and then they go back to their real clients and say "here is the menu," or "here is what we recommend." When I was in the game, by far the most popular were the "market-neutral" and "arbitrage" funds because they could absorb any amount of money and play all around the world without being hostage to "the market." They make money no matter what, which is the definition of what you are supposed to want if you are a client. These managers can take advantage of the vast discrepancies that exist in the markets worldwide and borrow a lot of money to exploit them.

That's hard if you are a pure stock guy. It is true that Pepsi (PEP) is cheaper than Coke (KO) on a price-to-growth metric. (Coke grows slower than Pepsi but has a higher multiple.) But does that mean you can go long Pepsi and short Coke and the twain meets? I wouldn't bet that way. But how about this? American Home Mortgage (AHM) issues $1 billion in mortgages that Citigroup (C) packages. American Home isn't a "deposit" institution with a broad range of businesses to fall back on. It just issues mortgages, 2 and 28, teaser, little documentation, etc., etc.

Citigroup pools all of those mortgages and offers them into a bond that yields 7%, say, as a blend of the payments. A market-neutral and an arbitrage fund manager might say, "OK, I have $1 billion under management. I will go to Citigroup and borrow 10 billion and invest in these kinds of bonds." They yield 7%, I am borrowing at 5%, I get 2% on all I lever up, which can produce, risk-free, a lot of return. It sure seems risk-free; the bonds are "highly rated" by S&P and Moody's, which gives me ample protection. I am not doing anything reckless. I am doing what every other manager in my class, the biggest and most profitable class, is doing. But the strategy isn't risk-free.

Only Treasuries are risk-free. Now I am showing a really consistent rate of return because of that trade and dozens like them -- regardless of the stock market. So funds of funds drool and throw money at me and I keep buying more mortgage-backed securities and borrowing Treasuries. I can handle trillions! Houses go up in value, mortgages get paid, employment's strong; that's all that matters. The bonds pay. But housing stops going up in 2006. I keep buying the bonds, but I keep reading there are defaults. I don't see it. My traders don't see it. Everything's seems very ethereal.

And then in June, Bear Stearns (BSC) , doing this strategy at its funds, gets told the bonds are moving down in value and it must put up more collateral. But it doesn't have much cash and all of it is deployed. So it sells some bonds to meet the call. But nobody wants the bonds; everyone reads the papers and knows that defaults are mounting. So by the time it finishes selling the bonds, which now have no natural buyers, the collateral is gone. The funds close. That happens in June. In July, the funds of funds get their reports and they see that, let's say, one of the funds is down 10%. They immediately put two and two together and they figure, "Wow, we could have a Bear on our hands."

They go to the manager with redemptions. But things are much worse than they seem. The "marks" -- meaning what the bonds in their portfolio are marked or priced at -- is some last sale price, presumably around par because they don't trade. A redemption notice forces the trade. There are no buyers. That's how a Sowood could be down 10% at the end of June and 50% a few weeks later. The marks are all lies.Nobody is getting anywhere near the price of the bonds, which has become subjective anyway because of the number of defaults within the bonds. All over the Street, these redemptions are happening. All over the Street, those doing these strategies are being wiped up.

There are not enough people who were short this stuff to buy it at what might turn out to be pretty good prices unless all the mortgages within the security are going to be wiped out. I would bet that half of these funds are gone this year. They represent trillions of dollars. You will hear a lot of chatter about "the resetting of risk premium" right now. And it is true. But what's really going on is lying prices. These strategies didn't take into account the risk of default. The agencies didn't take it into account. The packagers didn't. The homebuilders that relied on it didn't.

Because these same hedge funds were also the buyers of high-yield bonds for private equity -- same trade: borrow money against Treasuries to capture the differential -- they don't have the capital to buy the corporates. Again, discussed as "repricing of risk," when what it really is is defrocking of marks. But that would reveal the whole industry as glib and unthought-out and complacent, which is what it really was. This process is playing out everywhere, and the government isn't going to bail out these hedge funds. The good news is that it will happen fast.

The money will come out, the losses will be big, but these hedge funds will all be closed by year-end. Trillions will vanish. But then we will start all over again. Once this whole process is understood, the casualties, including some banks and some homebuilders and almost all mortgage companies except Countrywide (CFC) because it has a bank and lots of other businesses and is not a pure broker, will be taken. By November, this will be over. The stock market will rally before it is finished and the Fed will act to save a Washington Mutual (WM) and we will rally huge.

Let it play out. It's happening with Mach 5 velocity, so you won't have to wait too long. Some days stocks will rally because the pressure will look like it's over. Other days it will return. No one who did this strategy will survive. But then we will thrive.

Sooner rather than later.

Subprime fallout draws comparisons to past crises

NEW YORK (Reuters) - The turmoil sweeping the U.S. subprime mortgage market is starting to resemble some of the biggest financial crises of the past 100 years as its fallout infects credit conditions worldwide. While most analysts say it's too soon to hit the panic button, parallels to past crises are starting to fall in place: a domestic credit crunch, contagion to international markets and more volatility, followed by bank intervention.

On Thursday, the European Central Bank pumped a record 94.8 billion euros ($130.6 billion) into Europe's money markets, citing U.S. subprime mortgage problems. The Bank of Canada later injected C$1.455 billion ($1.37 billion) to help with liquidity shortfalls, while the U.S. Treasury said it "remains vigilant."The subprime situation has inspired comparisons to the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management and the Russian sovereign loan default, both in 1998, as well as to the U.S. savings and loans crisis of the 1980's. Some have even found similarities to the early stages of the Great Depression of 1930's.

"This process is a very old and familiar process," says Jack Malvey, chief global fixed income strategist at Lehman Brothers. "These are regular currents in capital markets -- there's a break in the chain from the weakest link and there's a ripple effect." In this case, the "weakest link" are subprime borrowers, those with checkered credit histories who were granted loans during the U.S. housing boom. They were the first group to miss home loan payments or default.

The risk is now widening to so-called Alt-A mortgages, a pool of alternative loans made to A-rated borrowers that could not meet typical prime borrowing terms. As with past crises, the problem is also moving beyond domestic borders to affect global markets. Most view the current situation as a natural adjustment after years of easy money. They say it has not yet reached the stage that LTCM reached in 1998, when the Federal Reserve was forced to initiate a bailout of the hedge fund to stave off a wider financial collapse. Malvey says the current credit squeeze is not necessarily a sign that the financial system is in trouble. What's happening is a washing away of excess that fed an unprecedented binge of leveraged buyouts and lax lending to unqualified borrowers. Like in any great flood, weaker players will get washed away, while stronger players will remain standing.

Malvey says the current squeeze may resemble the so-called Banker's Panic of 1907, exactly a century ago. That crisis started with the failure of New York banks after financial innovation led to excesses. It ultimately triggered wider panic throughout global markets. Similarly, dozens of mortgage lenders have closed or curtailed business in recent months, and a flurry of deals to finance LBOs through debt have been canceled or put on hold due to their exposure to subprime loans. The cap on new bond sales started to loosen on Wednesday, as $15 billion in new debt was sold, the highest daily volume this year, according to Bank of America. Even so, "this isn't over," said Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody's Economy.com Inc., a unit of Moody's Corp. that provides economic research. "The correction is in full swing and there is the potential that there is another shoe or boot to fall."

A SCALE OF 10

So how does the current environment measure up? In a report this week, Lehman rates the current credit tightening as a "7" on a scale of "1" (minor) to "10" (terrible). Malvey sees room for improvement and advises investors to start buying high-quality debt now. Mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities, high-grade corporate bonds are cheap at current levels, according to Lehman. Those debt securities will be more valuable by December 31 than current valuations, Malvey said.

"All credit crises belong to the same species but each has its own DNA," said Malvey, who cites the 1998 Russian default and LTCM crisis; the Middle East War and Arab oil embargo from 1973 to 1975; and the 1981-82 recession as the worst of recent crises. While world economic and corporate fundamentals are far superior in 2007 than was the case during past market upheavals, Malvey concedes that events could get worse. "We're maybe in the third or fourth inning," Malvey said.

WORSE THAN S&L

Josh Rosner, a mortgage expert from Graham Fisher, a New York-based investment research firm, forecasts that losses from deteriorating U.S. subprime loans will surpass the S&L crisis in the 1980s. While most analysts say it is premature to equate the current credit squeeze to past crises, they generally agree that the seeds of financial disruption have been sown. Whether they come to fruition depends on the severity of future mortgage defaults and the ripple effects of those losses. Rosner forecasts more than $200 billion in total losses to investors and homeowners, compared with about $125 billion in losses from the S&L debacle.

"In terms of ultimate losses, it will be worse," Rosner said. "It's a bleeding into the system, a drag on the economy over the life of these mortgages." The worst losses on mortgages originated in 2006 won't even start to have an impact on the market until the end of 2008, Rosner said. "That's all the analysis you need to know things will get worse," he said.

Why Economists Are Jittery about the Stock Market

By Paul Krugman, The New York Times. Posted August 10, 2007.

In September 1998, the collapse of Long Term Capital Management, a giant hedge fund, led to a meltdown in the financial markets similar, in some ways, to what's happening now. During the crisis in '98, I attended a closed-door briefing given by a senior Federal Reserve official, who laid out the grim state of the markets. "What can we do about it?" asked one participant. "Pray," replied the Fed official.

Our prayers were answered. The Fed coordinated a rescue for L.T.C.M., while Robert Rubin, the Treasury secretary at the time, and Alan Greenspan, who was the Fed chairman, assured investors that everything would be all right. And the panic subsided.

Yesterday, President Bush, showing off his M.B.A. vocabulary, similarly tried to reassure the markets. But Mr. Bush is, let's say, a bit lacking in credibility. On the other hand, it's not clear that anyone could do the trick: right now we're suffering from a serious shortage of saviors. And that's too bad, because we might need one.

What's been happening in financial markets over the past few days is something that truly scares monetary economists: liquidity has dried up. That is, markets in stuff that is normally traded all the time -- in particular, financial instruments backed by home mortgages -- have shut down because there are no buyers.

This could turn out to be nothing more than a brief scare. At worst, however, it could cause a chain reaction of debt defaults.

The origins of the current crunch lie in the financial follies of the last few years, which in retrospect were as irrational as the dot-com mania. The housing bubble was only part of it; across the board, people began acting as if risk had disappeared.

Everyone knows now about the explosion in subprime loans, which allowed people without the usual financial qualifications to buy houses, and the eagerness with which investors bought securities backed by these loans. But investors also snapped up high-yield corporate debt, a k a junk bonds, driving the spread between junk bond yields and U.S. Treasuries down to record lows.

Then reality hit -- not all at once, but in a series of blows. First, the housing bubble popped. Then subprime melted down. Then there was a surge in investor nervousness about junk bonds: two months ago the yield on corporate bonds rated B was only 2.45 percent higher than that on government bonds; now the spread is well over 4 percent.

Investors were rattled recently when the subprime meltdown caused the collapse of two hedge funds operated by Bear Stearns, the investment bank. Since then, markets have been manic-depressive, with triple-digit gains or losses in the Dow Jones industrial average -- the rule rather than the exception for the past two weeks.

But yesterday's announcement by BNP Paribas, a large French bank, that it was suspending the operations of three of its own funds was, if anything, the most ominous news yet. The suspension was necessary, the bank said, because of "the complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments" -- that is, there are no buyers.

When liquidity dries up, as I said, it can produce a chain reaction of defaults. Financial institution A can't sell its mortgage-backed securities, so it can't raise enough cash to make the payment it owes to institution B, which then doesn't have the cash to pay institution C -- and those who do have cash sit on it, because they don't trust anyone else to repay a loan, which makes things even worse.

And here's the truly scary thing about liquidity crises: it's very hard for policy makers to do anything about them.

The Fed normally responds to economic problems by cutting interest rates -- and as of yesterday morning the futures markets put the probability of a rate cut by the Fed before the end of next month at almost 100 percent. It can also lend money to banks that are short of cash: yesterday the European Central Bank, the Fed's trans-Atlantic counterpart, lent banks $130 billion, saying that it would provide unlimited cash if necessary, and the Fed pumped in $24 billion.

But when liquidity dries up, the normal tools of policy lose much of their effectiveness. Reducing the cost of money doesn't do much for borrowers if nobody is willing to make loans. Ensuring that banks have plenty of cash doesn't do much if the cash stays in the banks' vaults.

There are other, more exotic things the Fed and, more important, the executive branch of the U.S. government could do to contain the crisis if the standard policies don't work. But for a variety of reasons, not least the current administration's record of incompetence, we'd really rather not go there.

Let's hope, then, that this crisis blows over as quickly as that of 1998. But I wouldn't count on it.


© 2007 The New York Times

Friday, 10 August 2007

The greatest economic boom ever

A lot could go wrong. And it may not feel like a day at the beach to most Americans. But for your average globetrotting Fortune 500 CEO, right now is about as good as it gets, says Fortune's Rik Kirkland.


(Fortune Magazine) -- Just how red-hot is the current worldwide expansion? "This is far and away the strongest global economy I've seen in my business lifetime," U.S. Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson declared on a recent visit to Fortune's offices.

That may come as news to many Americans, whose boom-time memories are stuck in the 1990s, when Silicon Valley was the epicenter of our growth fantasies. But the fellow now occupying Paulson's old office at 85 Broad Street in downtown Manhattan shares that upbeat view. Just returned from a ribbon-cutting ceremony in the Middle East, Goldman Sachs (Charts, Fortune 500) CEO Lloyd Blankfein waves out toward the East River as he explains how the rise of the "BRICs" has altered his strategy and his travel schedule. (BRIC is an acronym Goldman coined in 2001 reflecting the rising economic power of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.)


"I helped make my career by being very disciplined about opening offices," he says. Yet in nine months Blankfein has announced or opened offices in São Paulo, Moscow, Tel Aviv, Mumbai, Qatar, and now Dubai. "We've never done anything close to that before," he marvels. "The week before Dubai, I was in Turkey, and before that, Russia and China. I'm really living the BRICs-plus-Middle East kind of life."

These days more and more CEOs are livin' la vida BRIC. GE's (Charts, Fortune 500) Jeff Immelt devotes 12 weeks a year to foreign travel and is looking for his company to grow "twice as fast outside the U.S. as inside - 12% a year, vs. 6%." Immelt expects to see even more robust growth - 20% a year - in emerging markets, which last year accounted for $30 billion of GE's nearly $170 billion in sales.

John Chambers, who last fall opened Cisco's (Charts, Fortune 500) new Globalization Center in Bangalore, seconds the notion that "this is the strongest global trend" of his career. "There is a unique balance today," he says. "More than half of GDP growth is coming from emerging countries. And yet the developed countries are also doing pretty well. It is something we have never seen before."

At Boeing (Charts, Fortune 500), Jim McNerney and his team, just back from the Paris Air Show, have booked 634 firm orders for their new 787 jet, which they will unveil in Seattle on 7/8/07 (ah, marketing!). That's more than for any launch in industry history, and thanks go "predominantly to Asian and other emerging-market buyers," says Laurette Koellner, president of Boeing International.

While the current pace isn't quite a record - according to the IMF the world grew at a 5.4% average annual rate from 1970 to 1973, vs. a projected 4.9% from 2003 through 2007- there's really no contest. When our ties were fatter and we were thinner, total world GDP was $13 trillion in constant dollars. Today it's more than $36 trillion. Not to mention, as investor Jim Rogers notes, "there are three billion people in places like Eastern Europe, Russia, India, China, and all of Asia who weren't participating last time around but who now are." Back then, Germany and Japan led the charge. Now the emerging markets are running fastest, along with Europe, which has - for the first time in years - pulled ahead of the U.S. in GDP growth.

The last global good time in the 1970s, of course, ended in a nasty bout of double-digit inflation, spawning the worst stock market crash since the Great Depression, plus other horrors, such as the rise of disco. Is that sorry past our future? Not necessarily. But with nervousness rising over everything from Bear Stearns' battered hedge funds to tightening lending standards that could clog the crowded private-equity deal pipeline, let us first explain how one can be, as we are, short-term bearish but long-run bullish on the global growth story.

When it comes to markets, we hold these truths to be self-evident: (1) It's never different this time, and (2) Every boom leads to financial excesses that spark its undoing. (That's why they're called business cycles.) "The necessary conditions for a bubble to form are quite simple and number only two," investor Jeremy Grantham noted in a recent newsletter headlined "The First Truly Global Bubble." "First, the fundamental economic conditions must look at least excellent - and near perfect is better. Second, liquidity must be generous in quantity and price: It must be easy and cheap to leverage." That pretty much sums up the world we've been living in, a world where prices skyrocketed for Miami condos, Indian stocks, and office towers in Dubai.

Now, though, with interest rates going up, heavily leveraged hedge funds and private-equity firms - not to mention cash-short adjustable-mortgage holders and the bankers who've lent to all three groups - have trillions of reasons to worry. Wilbur Ross, who earned a fortune correctly timing the distressed debt market, is among those who see a "real risk" of a credit shock. The subprime meltdown in the U.S., Ross believes, "isn't remotely over." "More important," he adds, "the same lack of discipline in extending credit has very much become prevalent in the corporate market as well." Since liquidity is more about crowd psychology than the actual money, a financial implosion could spook lenders, cutting off the easy financing that has fueled the record M&A and LBO booms and helped lift stocks to new heights. (That's why they're called credit crunches.)

Then there's the really scary stuff: the prospect of a conflict in the Middle East that spills into full-blown war, an act of nuclear terrorism, and the like. Such "exogenous shocks," in the clinical argot of economists, would likely cause far more lasting damage than any mere market correction. In that sense "globalization remains a delicate phenomenon," says historian Niall Ferguson, whose writings offer vivid reminders of how the chaos of world war ended the first great round of this process early in the last century - and could do so again.

Still, as long as some big geopolitical turmoil doesn't break out - and we're talking Ferguson-level large and bloody, as in August 1914, not October 1973 - the world economy should continue to benefit from globalization. Cross-border trade has soared since the early 1970s to record levels of world GDP. Cross-border financial flows have grown even faster, at a nearly 11% compound annual growth rate since 1990, according to McKinsey & Co. (Disclosure: I do occasional projects for McKinsey.) Much of that investment has generated strong returns, judging by one key measure: Since 1998, GDP per capita in the developing world has risen 4.5% a year, twice the rate of the advanced economies.

The bottom line: If you look past the market's cyclical gyrations, deep secular shifts in technology, productivity, and patterns of consumption do, indeed, "change everything" - or at least change a lot of things. Consider Cisco. Anyone who bought its stock, now at $28, near the $80 peak seven years ago is still hurting. (And if you bought it on margin, God bless you.) But though the bursting of the tech bubble vaporized trillions of dollars of wealth, the revolution marched on. Today over 500 million households are connected to the Internet, more than double the number in 2000 - and half live in the emerging world. Cisco itself now enjoys sales of nearly $30 billion (up from some $19 billion in fiscal 2000), and profits have more than doubled.

The long view matters. Which is why, having made billions by betting that rising emerging-world demand would spur consolidation in the long-moribund steel industry, Wilbur Ross is now trying to ride a similar trend in auto parts. Since August 2004 he has built up a $5-billion-a-year parts supplier from scratch, mostly by acquiring companies overseas on the cheap - "without adding debt," he hastens to add. It's why real estate billionaire Sam Zell, no dewy-eyed optimist but a tough, successful bargain hunter with a bad-ass nickname ("Gravedancer"), even ventures to suggest how things really are different this time. During the 1970s oil producers squandered their newfound gains by making government bank loans to "countries incapable of using it," he says. "Now it's mostly going into rainy-day funds or into productive private investments in places like China and India. That's a whole different kettle of fish from what we dealt with in the past."

And it's why the transformations we've witnessed during this go-go beginning to the 21st century are mere prologue.

***

"We want to go global by going East, not West," says Mohamed Ali Alabbar, the dynamic chairman of Emaar Properties, onstage at the Madinat Jumeirah resort in Dubai. The crowd in the cavernous room divides sartorially between business-suits-and-ties and white-robes-with-burnooses. Outside, motorized dhows ply canals lined with gleaming luxury hotels and shops. Up and down the main road hundreds of cranes twist under the desert sun, as builders race to erect more skyscrapers more quickly than anyplace on earth - among them Emaar's own Burj Dubai, which, when completed next year, will claim the title of world's tallest building. But this morning Ali Alabbar is talking mainly about the scores of malls and housing developments he plans to build in India and North Africa. "The West has got aging populations and aging economies," he says. "The East is where the true glamour lies." Ouch. Still, the man has a point.

As the action moves to emerging economies, think of what's playing out as a global version of America's postwar boom. To catch up, these large populations first require commodities and basic building materials - witness the threefold-plus increase in prices of steel, oil, and copper since 2000. Then, as incomes rise, they spur vast new markets for everything from detergents to cellphones, from airports to hospitals. The McKinsey Global Institute forecasts that over the next decade nearly 450 million newcomers will join the middle class in China and India alone.

Sam Zell is a believer: "I think this consumption story is kicking in on a worldwide basis." To get his share he bought big stakes in two public homebuilding companies in Brazil and Mexico and in the last year has begun investing in new low-cost housing in China and Egypt.

At the same time, growing economies give rise to a new crowd of competitors and entrepreneurs. Think Brazilian jetmaker Embraer or Chinese PC maker Lenovo or Indian expatriate Lakshmi Mittal, who has built a steel colossus with some 10% of global market share. Surely it's early days for this trend, you say? "I hope it's early days," counters Goldman's Blankfein, "because we're investing now from the point of view that this has crossed a tipping point. You ignore the emergence of these new entrepreneurs at the peril not just of losing share in a local market, but of threatening your global franchise."

Jeff Immelt isn't making that mistake. Last fall he took a list created by Boston Consulting Group of the 100 most important companies in developing economies and arrayed it into four camps: customers, suppliers, competitors, and nonaligned. "I tell my leadership team, 'Our goal for this group is to have lots of customers, lots of suppliers - and no competitors,'" he says.

To stay ahead, Immelt is pushing GE hard into an advanced phase of globalization he calls "in country, for the world." That may sound like some celebrity ditty composed for Live Earth, but Immelt is quite serious. He believes that by figuring out how to meet demand in these still relatively poor growth markets, he's going to achieve hard-to-imagine price breakthroughs. And here's what's truly radical: As GE and others do this, these products won't just be sold in emerging markets. Instead they'll filter back into the rich economies - a new deflationary force that should delight buyers but devastate competitors who lack a global footprint.

Examples? "Water," says Immelt. "There's a shortage everywhere, even in places like California and Florida. Some systems we're working on in the Middle East, India, and China are trying to do water desalination at $0.001 per milliliter, which is an off-the-charts low cost. We'll never hit that in the U.S. But we'll hit it someplace outside. And the second we do, a huge market is going to open up inside as well." Immelt sees the same thing happening with coal-sequestration technology or MRI scanners, where GE is working on a product in China that could cut prices in half. "At the right cost point, you not only sell it in China, you open up a market among the 35% of U.S. hospitals that today cannot afford to have an MR scanner," he says. "We've got 15 or 20 projects like this that are going to open up big markets around the world over the next five years."

GE's not alone. Another market to watch: small cars, where the big American, Japanese, and Korean makers are now tussling with locals to grab share in China and India. The new models that emerge will first be sold locally and then to other emerging countries. "But believe me, the goal isn't just emerging markets," says Hari Nair, president of international for auto parts maker Tenneco, which today gets 58% of its sales overseas. This intense competition is spurring innovation, such as the work Nair's team is doing in India to help Tata Motors introduce a "one lakh" car by 2009. (A lakh is 100,000, as in rupees, or roughly $2,500.)

"These environments challenge you to do things you never imagined," says Nair. "You can't just rely on the traditional markets of the West. You've got to be part of new ways of doing business." (For more on the way the emerging world can affect prices, see "How Microsoft Conquered China.")

***

"Sustaining the miracle." That was the theme of a conference I hosted as Fortune's deputy editor in May 1997 in Bangkok, a few weeks before a run on the Thai baht metastasized into a vicious deflationary spiral that soon threatened all Asia - and for a time, it seemed, the global economy. Did anyone gassing on in Bangkok see it coming? Ha!

It's cold comfort to note we weren't alone. The World Bank had just published a special report on the East Asia economic miracle. The airwaves and op-ed pages back then were larded with paeans extolling "Asian values." But the truth is, we blew it. Here's the other funny thing, though: Ten years later it's clear that, despite the very real pain, it was all little more than a bad bump on an upward road.

So where does the world stand today? A little less complacent, at least measured by column inches and airtime. Not a day passes that someone doesn't fret about any number of potential buzz killers: protectionist sentiment in Congress; the humongous U.S. current-account deficit; unprecedented levels of debt buoyed up by know-nothing-and-don't-want-to lenders; the housing slump; and more. On the other hand, measured by what really matters - the money - Mr. Market so far doesn't seem too rattled. Risk spreads, or the gap between historically sketchy paper, such as emerging-market debt or junk bonds, and risk-free Treasuries remain near all-time lows.

Somebody's wrong. Our guess - and that's all it is - is that the next big move won't be up. Alan Greenspan pondered this scenario in his farewell address at the Fed's annual shindig in Jackson Hole, Wyo., two years ago. Quoth the maestro: "Any onset of increased investor caution elevates risk premiums and, as a consequence, lowers asset values and promotes the liquidation of the debt that supported higher asset prices. This is the reason that history has not dealt kindly with the aftermath of protracted periods of low risk premiums." Translation: If a correction occurs, what went up fastest - historically more volatile things like Shanghai shares, Turkish bonds, or the last LBO through the gate, say - will go down even faster. (On Wall Street the pros call that kind of volatility an asset's "beta" - it's a Greek term, but think of it this way: as in "beta beware.")

Assuming history at some point proves yet again unkind, we don't pretend to know how far things will fall, or when they will bounce back. Nor are we ready to buy the notion whispered in some circles that, hey, since global growth is already so robust, if the U.S. goes into recession, can't the rest of the world keep chugging? That day may come, but it's not here yet. As the world's champion buyer of last resort, the U.S. consumer right now remains the global economy's broad-shouldered, albeit increasingly weary, Atlas. If Atlas shrugs ... look out below.

So while it's a wonderful world, as Hank Paulson notes, "it pays to be vigilant." When it comes to financial shocks, Paulson says, we haven't repealed the laws of "economic gravity," so "it's when, not if." (See more of Paulson's comments on the world's economy.) Here's how Lloyd Blankfein is reconciling that potential for short-term fear with long-term optimism. Even as his firm expands abroad, he has lately been lengthening debt maturities (thus lessening Goldman's interest rate risk). And he's been making sure he has plenty of cash on hand, just in case: $50 billion or more by the latest count. Sounds right. There's going to be a lot of growth ahead - for those who stick around to enjoy it.

Reporter associate Doris Burke contributed to this article. Top of page

How Speculators Exploit Market Fears

By Ben Stein

Here's a fact: The speculators and hedge fund managers who run today's stock market need market volatility in order to make money.

They can't make enough money if the market stays flat or moves only a bit, so they like extreme and unexpected price movements. They especially like sudden, surprise movements down, when they can make money off stocks they borrow and sell -- or, as they say, "sell short."

Money Lust Satisfied

That's what's been happening the past couple of weeks. But it's not interesting to say that the speculators are whipping the market around to satisfy their money lust. So the speculators themselves make up reasons for why the market is fluctuating, flog those reasons to the media, and then profit if some other speculators believe the jive reasons and jump in the way the manipulators want them to.

Supposedly, the market is "correcting" because of worries about the housing slowdown, and also because of fears that the debt markets that support mergers and acquisitions is drying up.

These are interesting theories, and people who don't know a lot about the stock market or the economy might find them beguiling. What follows are a few truths that show how shallow these "reasons" for the stock market moves are.

Housing a Theory

Yes, the housing market has slowed from a spectacular bubble level to a simply pretty good level. Housing sales and starts are now about what they were in 2002, and no one thought we were in a housing depression then.

In any event, housing is only about 5 percent of the economy. If it falls by 15 percent, that would represent a fall-off of about .75 percent. That's not trivial, but it's also not the stuff of which recessions are made.

The fact is that there is no recession. The economy is suffering from a labor shortage, not a surplus of unemployment. The Fed is worried about excess demand, not slack demand.

Corporate profits set new records every day. Whatever's happening in residential sales and building is simply not slowing down the economy. Why should a Boeing or a Merck or a Pfizer have any reaction to housing at all? Because the speculators sell everything they can when nervousness sets in -- and for no other reason.

A Minor Major Mess

Subprime is a mess. But it's a small mess. Subprime mortgages account for roughly 20 percent of mortgages even in the most heavily exposed states. About 20 percent of them are delinquent in some way. That's 4 percent of mortgages.

Of these, maybe half, or 2 percent, will go into foreclosure. There will be roughly 50 percent recovery on sale of these. This is a loss of 1 percent in the mortgage market -- a sum the lenders have already made many times over because of the hefty fees on those deals. In the context of the size of the U.S. financial sector, it's nothing.

And why should a crisis in subprime drive down stocks in Mexico and Thailand? Again, because the speculators seek to create panic to make money by selling short, and they sell short everything.

There's simply no connection between subprime and developed or developing nations' stocks. This by itself shows the thin context of the selling wave late last month.

Money's Still Cheap

What about the supposed drying up of loans for mergers and acquisitions by private equity firms? Well, here's a good, simple test of just how valid that explanation is for stock market moves: The majority of private equity takeovers are financed with junk debt.

If there really were a major shortage of funds for these deals, the interest rate on the junk would skyrocket. Instead, while the rate has risen by about 150 basis points in the past month, the spread between junk and investment grade is now about 290 basis points, according to leading junk analyst Martin Fridson.

This is a lot lower than the year-end average of the spread from 2002 to 2006, and far below the almost 800 basis point spread during a true interest-rate crunch like the one after the tech meltdown in 2000-2002.

So that's phony, too. Interest rates have risen, but not anything like what they've done in real crises. And besides, the Dow fell by about 550 points the week before last, yet not one of the Dow stocks is involved as either acquiror or acquiree in a private equity deal.

In short, money is no longer virtually free the way it was for private equity deals in the past year. But it's not expensive by historical standards, either.

Spreading the Fear

In other words, it's all the speculators trying to panic us so their sell programs will make money. And they'll make money as long as they can spread their panic. When they can't do that any longer, they'll work the long side -- and make up reasons for that, too.

In the meantime, the economy is strong. Profits are great, and interest rates are low and will stay that way. Don't sell. With all the shrieking about the market, it only fell to what it was about five weeks ago -- and we didn't think we were poor then.

So let the speculators shout "fire." As of right now, they're not blowing anything but smoke.

Look For Leaders In Top Industry Groups

Some investors love hunting for bargains. They go after the stocks that have fallen 50% in a month. Or they'll pick up the stock that's been treading water while its industry rivals have been soaring.

But that means they'll rarely end up with the leading stocks in a top-tier industry group.

Whether a stock crashes due to an earnings miss or bad news in the company's industry, it has an uphill battle ahead.

Don't you want the stock that goes from 30 to 300? First it has to go to 31, then 32, then 33 ... trading at 15 doesn't do you any good.

So how can you search for the best stocks in leading industry groups?

IBD's Industry Groups shows you which sectors lead the market. The New Price Highs list is sorted by sectors with the most stocks hitting new highs, a sign of strength.

For instance, in Wednesday's IBD, 30 Medical stocks hit new highs, followed by 11 Business Services and eight Retail stocks.

But you can't buy just any Medical stock. Since Medical includes everything from drug firms to hospitals to device makers, the sector is broken down into 14 groups.

Check IBD's Industry Group Rankings to find out how each group has been performing. For the best odds of finding leaders, focus on the top 40 groups.

To find out which stocks lead in their groups, you first want to have a list of possible buy candidates. Go to investors.com's IBD Stock Checkup, type in a ticker symbol, and you'll get the top five stocks in that company's group.

The screen shot above shows the Stock Checkup results for a leader in the No. 1 group, Chemicals-Fertilizers. The group has held the top spot for the past few months.

Fertilizer maker Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan (NYSE:POT - News) has been a regular in each week's IBD 100. If you type in the ticker symbol, POT, you see that it gets an Overall Rating of 99 (A+). That helps it earn the top spot in its 13-member group.

Just below the rankings, you'll find the top five companies trading above $10 in the group. Potash leads, followed by Sociedad Quimica y Minera (NYSE:SQM - News) and Mosaic (NYSE:MOS - News).

Even if the stock you're looking up is the leader, you still need to do further research. Make sure it meets all your buy criteria.

A leading stock's action can often tell you how other group members may be performing. IBD studies show that about half of a stock's move stems from group strength.

Mortgage delinquencies, defaults spreading: AIG

NEW YORK (Reuters) - American International Group, one of the biggest U.S. mortgage lenders, warned on Thursday that mortgage defaults are spreading.

While saying that most of its mortgage insurance and residential loans were safe, AIG made a presentation to analysts and investors that showed delinquencies are becoming more common among borrowers in the category just above subprime.

Although acknowledging the "significant declines" in subprime securities, Chief Executive Martin Sullivan said AIG's tight underwriting standards had minimized losses and he was "poised to take advantage of opportunities" in the mortgage market.

AIG was at $65.41, down $1.07, or 1.6 percent, on the New York Stock Exchange in late morning trading. The Standard & Poor's insurance index was down 2.3 percent.

AIG said delinquency rates for first mortgages had risen to 3.98 percent in June from 3.56 percent in April and a low of 3.08 percent in July 2005. First mortgages represent 90 percent of AIG's domestic mortgage business.

AIG divided its mortgage portfolio into three categories: subprime, for borrowers with credit scores below 620; "nonprime," for borrowers with credit scores between 620 and 659, and prime, for borrowers with credit ratings above 660.

As of June 30, AIG's finance arm, which originates first and second mortgages, recorded delinquencies of 3.68 percent in subprime, 2.13 percent in nonprime, and 0.81 percent in prime.

AIG, the world's largest insurer, said total delinquencies in its $25.9 billion mortgage insurance portfolio were 2.5 percent, but did not give year-ago figures.

It said 10.8 percent of subprime mortgages were 60 days overdue, compared with 4.6 percent in the category with credit scores just above subprime.

"Problems in July have gone beyond the subprime market," said Bill Bergman, an analyst with Morningstar. "Maybe not AIG, but some of these lenders have been whistling in the dark."

(Reporting by Ed Leefeldt)

Thursday, 9 August 2007

Subprime mortgage collapse: why Bear Stearns is just the start

This is not the idle chatter of permanent bears. The subprime mortgage collapse now hitting Bear Stearns may be just the start.

Serious analysts from big investment firms are talking ominously about "the big one". It will make you angry to learn just how the investment industry has got you involved.

If you can understand what's happening, you should have time to move. So let's get to the bottom of it now, and in plain English.

From subprime mortgage to MBS

It all starts with the mortgage. About six million people in the United States who have no money have borrowed about 100% of the value of a house, right at the top of a housing market which has since fallen sharply. These are the subprime borrowers.

The lenders, however, did not have to worry very much about the risk of default, because they rolled these mortgages into bonds called Mortgage-Backed Securities, which they then sold. They got to be off-risk within a few weeks, because by then these re-packaged mortgages belonged to other financial organizations.

But it is not always easy to sell a package of these Mortgage-Backed Securities (known as MBS for short). Selling such a product demands that the credit quality is assessed; and because the underlying mortgages are subprime they are quite likely to go into default.

So a credit-ratings agency will only give the subprime MBS a low credit score, which means it is not considered investment grade. That disqualifies it from the portfolios of many professionally managed funds.

This is where it pays to get a bunch of smart investment bankers involved.
The investment bankers slice the MBS into several "tranches". These are known as Collateralized Debt Obligations, or CDOs for short. The idea is to create some higher risk assets and some much safer ones by slicing up the MBS into what are called equity (high risk), mezzanine (middle risk) and the much sought-after investment grade bonds (low risk).
Higher risk equals higher returns, of course, so the equity tranche of the MBS will earn the highest profits if things go well. But if things start to go wrong, the equity is lost first, and then the mezzanine. Even then, the investment-grade bonds could still get fully paid out. This persuades the credit ratings agencies to give the lowest-risk tranche a high enough credit rating to qualify for the critical investment grade rating.

In this way the investment bank has created a decent proportion of highly marketable bonds out of a package of low-quality mortgages. Fairly standard, for example, is to convert a large package of MBS into perhaps 80% investment-grade bonds, 10% mezzanine, and 10% equity.

How investment banks distribute the debt

The original mortgage lender is in a hurry to get the whole MBS sold off, because this raises cash which can then go to fund fresh mortgage loans to new subprime borrowers. The investment bank is well motivated to slice up the MBS, because selling investment products is what it does best. It won't want to keep much, if any, of the newly created CDO tranches, because investment banks earn their money primarily by deal-making and distribution, rather than by taking risks with borrowers.

In the market for CDOs, the investment bank will find it relatively easy to sell the investment grade bonds. They go mostly to respectable institutions. But the mezzanine and particularly the equity tranches can be trickier to dispose of. The effect of concentrating the risk, as well as the upside, in these tranches is to make them "hot" – so hot, in fact, that investment insiders sometimes call them "toxic waste".

How can these toxic bonds be sold off? There are several ways.

Method One: Create a hedge fund

The investment bank might choose to set up a hedge fund, possibly even using some of its own money to get the fund started. The hedge fund's objective is to trade in the high-risk equity and mezzanine CDO instruments.

Let's imagine that the investment bank puts up the first $10 million. The hedge fund then buys the equity tranche of the CDO from the investment bank. In effect, the investment bank is actually buying the equity from itself.

With a bit of luck – and this is what happened over recent years – the housing market then goes up. Now the CDO equity is floating higher in the water, because there's a cushion of higher house prices preventing those original subprime borrowers from defaulting. This rather obscure equity instrument, which is not traded on any open market, and so is not a liquid asset that can readily be bought and sold, should now be worth more than it was at issue.

It gets marked up in value, and it gets marked up much faster than the underlying house prices, because all the price volatility is concentrated in this thin slice of CDO equity. The hedge fund is now a real performer! And that means it will be rewarded by further investment from outside. So what started as a vehicle with a little investment bank cash can grow the funds it manages under its own steam.

Next, and this is what hedge funds are all about, it will leverage its risk, too. The hedge fund goes out to an unrelated lending bank, holding its high-performing but illiquid toxic waste in its hand, and it asks to borrow money using the waste as collateral. The lending bank has access to cheap money, and so it has the prospect of lending for spectacular profits.

Now the MBS wheel is fully in motion. With a little co-operation from the investment bank, to which it is closely related, the hedge fund loses no time in marking up the value of its equity CDOs, on the basis of rising house prices. There is an overwhelming pressure to do so, not least because the hedge fund managers are rewarded on performance. Alas, in the absence of a genuine open market, it is too easy to manipulate the CDO's price up to an unrealistic value.
The lending bank can see its collateral floating higher and higher in the water, and so it lends ever more cash against it to the hedge fund, and it picks up the new CDOs bought by the hedge fund as further collateral on new loans. Naturally, as with all collateral, the bank claims the right to sell the bonds if the underlying debt gets into trouble. But it doesn't look like a real danger at this stage.

So the money lent by the bank against the CDO equity goes back to the hedge fund, which buys more CDOs from the investment bank, which buys more MBS from the mortgage lender, which provides more money to subprime borrowers, who then buy more houses, pushing real-estate prices higher again.

This solution only gets into trouble when house prices turn sharply down. The lending banks ask for their money back, but the hedge funds haven't got it. All of it has been invested in CDO tranches. So the collateral needs to be sold. No problem, surely. It's on the books at a few billion dollars after all.

But with its concentration of risk in a falling market, the equity slice has been hemorrhaging value, without ever being bought or sold in an open exchange. It's incredibly painful for the investment banker to mark down a paper price in these circumstances. First, he doesn't actually know for sure that the price is falling any more than he knew it was rising when he marked the price up. But he does know that marking the price down will immediately be bad for him, his team, his bank, his customer and everyone else. He doesn't have to be totally evil to put off marking down the price until tomorrow – or maybe the next day.

That's why the lending banks which later get hold of their collateral can be presented with a very nasty surprise when they finally try to redeem the situation with a sale. It simply won't fetch anything like the price it was last marked at.

Something like this is what happened to Bear Stearns' hedge funds. Its two funds were leveraged 5 times and 15 times respectively. That's the number of times they went round the financing wheel of leverage.

The smaller, more cautious fund had 5 times as much money invested in CDOs as it had received from its hedge fund investors in cash. This means that its balance sheet may have looked like this:

Assets Liabilities$5bn CDOs
$4bn bank loans
$1bn hedge fund investment

Whereas the bigger fund was 15 times leveraged. So its balance sheet could have looked like this:

Assets Liabilities$15bn CDOs
$14bn bank loans
$1bn hedge fund investment

So far, only the smaller hedge fund has been rescued and we await developments on the larger one.

The picture that is emerging is that the providers of the bank loans became increasingly nervous as US house prices turned down, and they wanted their money. Clearly, there were no cash assets in the hedge funds. So the banks took hold of the CDOs – their collateral – and went to sell them.

The first out of the door, rumored to be Merrill Lynch, mostly got the collateral it was owed, but it exhausted the CDO market of buyers. The rest found no bids and quickly stopped trying to sell for fear of advertising the rock-bottom prices of something which currently sits in many portfolios at funds all over the world.

Worse still, we are advised that the Bear Stearns funds were not actually invested in the toxic waste. They had bought the investment grade bonds. That clearly means the toxic waste and the mezzanine bonds have no value. We do not know who owns these.

Method Two: Dump the waste in landfill

"If it's not these failing hedge funds who own the toxic waste, then who does?" we asked another banker in a closely-related business.

A core competence of investment banks in this market is the ability to market the toxic waste, so it's one of their most sensitive commercial secrets. Our sources would only hint at where the mezzanine and equity CDOs are now sitting. We learned that at least some of it goes into tame, largely unsuspecting, and almost always "institutional" portfolios – the type of investment fund which looks after your money and lazily signs an indemnity to confirm to its brokers and banks its own professionalism and awareness of risk.

The same source smiles wryly when asked how these "investment landfills" get their daily value for the un-marketable sludge. They phone their investment bankers, and dutifully record in their bond valuation package the numbers they receive back. They have no motivation to do better.

That means some fund managers out there are habitually reporting asset values which are a fiction, and we don't know who they are. It's worth understanding that they are giving us the chance to get out, provided we move fast.

Often the exit price of such a fund is based on the asset value, and they have not yet recorded the worthlessness of their CDOs. For the time being, therefore, this would create the opportunity to do a Merrill Lynch, and get out ahead of the crowd.

Method Two is frowned on, however, and rightly so. Arguments of "moral hazard" demand that the investment bank should hold on to some, if not all, of the riskiest equity class.

Method Three: Synthetic CDOs

The third method on the face of it seems to resolve this question of moral hazard. It leaves the equity and mezzanine tranches with their creator (the investment bank) and thus exposes them to the possibility of being a victim of their own poor judgment.

But we'll see that it doesn't quite work that way. You didn't expect it would, did you?
To explain what happens, we need to delve deeper into the workings of the credit derivatives market. It's not hard to understand, provided we stick with plain English.

We need to get to grips with the "synthetic" CDO; and for that we need to understand its building block, which is the Credit Default Swap (known as a CDS for short). Here's how it works.
The investment bank is now the owner of the hard-to-sell and risky mezzanine and equity tranches. Rather than dumping them into landfill, it decides to retain them, along with all the cash flows that they generate. But the investment banker managing these CDOs also decides to take out an insurance policy – just in case the home loans go into default.

The investment bank pays an insurance premium to another investment institution for underwriting the risk of the underlying home-loans defaulting. Apart from a bit of legal drafting, that's all there is to a Credit Default Swap. In return for a cash payment, you swap the risk of default.

These insurance premiums, paid to the underwriter of the CDS, appear to the receiver as income – just like bond interest payments. But unlike a standard bond, they are paid without the receiver having to part with any cash himself. It's income received without putting your money at the disposal of the person who pays you. You are being paid for accepting risk, not for lending money.

So you see, the investment bankers have been very clever. They have said there are two components in a bond-interest payment: a fee for the use of your money, and a fee for the risk of default. The CDS simply separates out the element for the risk of default.

The investment bank can have still more fun with this. Because what the underwriting institution would see is just a stream of income payments. And just like the boring mortgage streams that we started with, these CDS streams can be aggregated into a pool...then divided into tranches with different risk profiles...producing the magic of higher credit ratings for lower-risk tranches...plus concentrated risk in new toxic waste.

If you can get a credit rating agency to assess these new tranches you have created, then you have something which looks like a CDO – and smells like a CDO – but which is not now based on cash flows deriving from borrowed money. Instead it is based on cash flows deriving exclusively from insurance premiums that are paid to cover the risk of mortgage default.

That's how CDSs get packaged into what is known as a "synthetic CDO", and the investment bank can sell them for what appear to be fantastic yields. Here is their pitch to investment funds that might be prospective buyers:

"You used to have to give me all your money to buy a boring old cash flow CDO, and then you were both lending your money and accepting the potential risk of the borrower defaulting. What I have for you today is the ability to accept only the better half of that deal.

"This new instrument means you can keep your money where it is, earning great returns in the stock market or wherever you're currently chasing performance, yet you will still receive income in return for underwriting the risk on a package of credit default swaps in the mortgage-backed security market.

"Look, I've got a great credit rating on this thing, and because we have eliminated the cash-borrowing aspect of the deal, I can sell you $1 million of synthetic CDO income for just $200,000.

"You get no extra risk above what you'd ordinarily accept, and a huge yield on your investment. You want in?"

It's a really neat deal. The investment bank is selling what the institution was already buying before – a steady income, in return for underwriting the total loss if there's a default. But now the risk of default is dissociated from interest cash-flow. The buyer doesn't need to give anyone the underlying cash lent. He can earn part of the income those assets pay simply by promising to stump up if there's a default.

Meanwhile, the investment bank is now holding onto the original CDO toxic waste. So to the untutored eye it looks thoroughly responsible. But we now know better. The important part of what it was supposed to hold onto – the risk of default – has now been parked in the broader financial markets.

Remember Lloyds of London?

The yield meanwhile looks irresistible. Of course it does! The synthetic CDO packaging has allowed the investment bank to sell something which previously it would have had to buy.
It is selling to the highest bidder the right to receive its mortgage default insurance premiums – so the buyer is just another "investment landfill". He ends up with what's called a "contingent liability", a prospective claim on other valuable assets in his investment portfolio.
Why would any investment fund possibly fall for this scheme? The modern fund manager has a powerful short-term incentive to get a strong performance out of your invested savings. If he gets 2% more than the next guy he is a genius, and he will get more money under his management, more fees, and bigger bonuses.

But do you remember Lloyds of London? It used to be the world's biggest insurance underwriter. The way it worked was that rich individuals were allowed to keep all their money invested in their favourite stocks and shares, but they could also earn a second income from those assets by pledging that same wealth to underwrite commercial insurance risks which were sliced and diced by syndicates on behalf of their members.

Many Lloyds members lost absolutely everything – houses, furniture and indeed their life – when a series of vicious insurance losses hit the world's insurance market through the early 90s. Acquiring synthetic CDOs is the modern professional money manager's equivalent of being a Lloyds member.

So you can see now how through the use of synthetic CDOs, fund managers can underwrite credit default risk and increase their income accordingly, without outlaying any fund capital. But they are placing their fund capital at risk. Your fund manager is a genius while there are no claims. But if it goes wrong, your fund gets hammered. These styles of risk expose whole portfolios, so a loss to a subprime synthetic CDO could cost a fund its entire holding of US Treasury Bills.

Out of bonds & into the ether

Now, just in case you thought the CDS and its packaging, the synthetic CDO, were as ethereal as a financial product could get, let's fill in a few details and take a few more steps along the road of infinite credit expansion.

It was not long before the investment banking industry had a "eureka" moment. They realised that actually holding the toxic waste was unnecessary. By offering CDSs and synthetic CDOs based on the worst possible companies they could make fantastic profits. In effect they could short-sell the bonds of the world's flakiest borrowers.

With it? These bright sparks started insuring against the default on CDS which they didn't even own! It's like noticing your friend is looking a bit ragged and taking out insurance on his life for your benefit, without him having anything to do with it. When Delphi Corp, a large motor parts spin-off from General Motors, got into serious trouble last year, its bonds fell into default. Incredibly, more than 10 times the nominal value of its bonds were then claimed from investment institution underwriters, by bankers who had insured against the default of bonds they didn't own by issuing Delphi CDSs.

This shows the perverse logic of the markets, which here dictate that the synthetic CDOs which will be found in the greatest numbers are the ones least deserving of the credit rating they've been given. And as long as there is demand for easy income there's no limit to how many of them may have been created.

Synthetic CDO market growth

The synthetic CDO market has shown truly remarkable growth in recent years. Probably the most respected issuer of statistics in international finance is the Bank for International Settlements. On this link http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0506.pdf it says that "credit-related derivatives rose by 568% in the three years ending June 2004." That growth was nearly 5 times as rapid as the overall growth in over-the-counter derivatives. By now you should be getting some idea of why this incredible growth rate occurred. During 2001-2004 interest rates around the globe were deeply depressed as the world's central bankers tried to reflate after the Dot Com bust and 9/11. Fund managers were desperate for yield and the slump in equities had destroyed stock-market portfolios everywhere.

Governments began trying to enforce investment prudence. One of the things they did was require retirement funds to make a better attempt to match their long-term liabilities to their assets. Equities had suddenly and spectacularly failed to do this. So legislation was introduced which forced funds to buy investment grade bonds. Offering a regular income with a very low risk of default, investment-grade bonds looked to be the perfect vehicle for institutions that must make regular payments to the world's pensioners.
It would have been thoroughly wrong of the investment banking industry not to do its utmost to find a source of top-grade bonds to satisfy this demand. Equally, it would have been naïve of them to allow their competitors to have the CDS and CDO market space all to themselves, unchallenged.

So in essence, it was government interference in the market which helped trigger the nascent CDS/CDO boom. Banks were soon queuing up to create investment grade instruments, and the income starved fund managers were gobbling them up. They had to – because we, the public, don't buy underperforming funds.

Want proof of what has been going on? One of the mysteries of recent years (to us anyway) has been the progressive narrowing of credit spreads. Basically what has happened is this.
Four years ago, dodgy bond issuers would have to offer a much higher yield than US Treasury Bills to get people to buy their debt issues. On average, since 1970, Fairly Flaky Debts Inc. – with a credit rating of BAA investment-grade – would need to pay almost exactly 3% more than T-Bills each year to its bond holders.

This difference is known as the "credit spread", and that extra income of 3% covered the fact that once every thirty-five years or so, companies like Fairly Flaky would fail and cost the bondholders 100% of their money; that's your money if the bondholder happened to be your fund manager. Yet by November 2006 bonds issued by Fairly Flaky Debts Inc. were yielding less than 1% above US Treasury bills. The risk premium had disappeared.
Why? The reason is that it had become easy to distribute default risk to income-hungry institutions. Investment banks had a risk-free bet, known as a credit arbitrage. They could borrow cheap money from Japan (that's another story, but there's plenty of cheap money about outside Tokyo too) and buy Fairly Flaky's bonds. They would then issue new CDS to income-hungry funds to offload the risk of default.

The statistical basis of credit ratings

After checking the credit rating the income hungry fund would accept a rock-bottom premium of about 1%, so the bank would be silly not to keep buying Fairly Flaky bonds yielding 3% above T-Bills until the yield dropped to T-Bills plus 1%. It works as long as they can dump the credit risk into landfills by selling more CDSs. That's why the Credit Spread, otherwise known as the risk premium, has now shrunk to a third of its long-run value.
The credit ratings agencies were obeying their standard model of evaluating risk on the basis of recent historic rates of default. That skewed the results, because of course there were almost no defaults in the previous 20 years. Nobody leaves their debt unpaid when the securing asset has risen in price much faster than the value of the debt.

That meant that the rating would be unlikely to fully factor in the risks of a housing price correction such as the one we have seen recently in the US.

Who is going to fail next?

We have hit upon a very rough and questionable method of identifying the next big failure in the CDO/CDS market. It may be coincidence, but if we had used this method a few months ago, it would have shown us to look first at Bear Stearns.

Why? Our sources indicate that Bear Stearns only has problems with those CDOs issued in respect of Mortgage Backed Securities created in 2005 and 2006. This is logical. Those CDOs were issued nearest to the peak of the US housing market, so they have the least float. Older CDO issues should have more headroom before defaults become a problem.
This would suggest that it is those firms who were late to the CDO party who should be in the deepest water. The following data was published by Standard and Poors in a 2005 report entitled "CDO Spotlight: Update To Sizing Collateral Manager Participation In The US Cash Flow CDO Market."

This table shows the ranking – by size of liabilities – of CDO managers at the end of 2004 and in the autumn of 2005. Bear Stearns jumped from nowhere to 13th place. It was late to the party, in other words. But it got busy very fast.

You can see the full data here...

We do not pretend to understand these statistics fully, and we strongly advise anyone to look at the original report. What is of interest is that the data seem to illustrate how Bear Stearns aggressively sought market share starting in 2005, which could be why it found itself one of the first to be in some trouble.

If that is true, then the data might point to some other coming failures. It would be a remarkably prescient analysis by Standard and Poors if that were to be the case. But of course it might be complete coincidence, too. Maybe Bear Stearns has better risk management, and so it is first to see where things are going wrong. Maybe other providers adopted different measures to protect their exposed funds. Who can tell?

By the way the data only concerns cash-flow CDOs. The synthetic part of the CDO market is not included. The synthetic market is bigger.

Comparison with LTCM

Long Term Capital Management failed in 1998. It was the last truly serious financial collapse which threatened the financial system. When LTCM went under, the bail-out fund required was $3.65 billion. The fund itself was leveraged to about $125 billion of assets using a similar style of wheel financing to the one described above for Bear Stearns' hedge funds.
There was also the presence of off-balance sheet devices called interest rate swaps – not so different in principle from the CDS described above.

Last week's rescue package announced for Bear Stearns smaller fund has been announced at $3.2 billion. We are awaiting the figures for the larger and more serious case. We believe the overall liabilities of both funds are in the $20-$25 billion range.

Back in 1998 LTCM was ploughing a lonely furrow. Its investment view was something to do with Russian bonds and the Japanese Yen. It was off the main investment spectrum, and there were few copy-cats putting the same market view into action in the same way.

That is where things are very different this time. The data produced by Standard and Poors above show just how conventional a strategy Bear Stearns has been following – all of it trailing the worldwide boom in housing markets. Many banks and funds are involved. Perhaps they are not quite so exposed as Bear Stearns, but it is only a matter of degree. This makes the size of the problem potentially much larger, and of much greater risk to the whole financial system.
How large? Well, the equity lost can be very roughly estimated from first principles. There are about 6,000,000 subprime mortgages in the USA. They typically result from re-financing deals – topping up to utilise whatever equity has accumulated in a house usually to pay off credit card debt; so they stay near 100% outstanding. The average house price in the USA is about $190,000, but we can reduce that to $150,000 on the assumption that we're at the lower end of the market. That gives us a principal sum of $900,000,000,000, which is 7 times the size of the LTCM exposure.

But the more serious figure – the housing equity lost to falling prices – is currently estimated at approaching 8% which is $72 billion. That doesn't include an adjustment for synthetic CDOs created by investment bankers to short the weakest MBSs, which is what they did with Delphi Corp.

Now you can see the difference in scale between LTCM and the subprime bust. This may be 20 times worse than LTCM. And it's getting worse – daily.

Conclusion: Beware toxic waste

At a time like this, we should not underestimate the skill of people like Ben Bernanke at the US Federal Reserve in underpinning the financial system. They have been remarkably effective at organising the lifeboats over many years and many crises. On the other hand the Bear Stearns episode could be the beginning of wider systemic difficulties.

Here at BullionVault we think the Bernankes of this world will one day fail. The result will be a credit squeeze. Bond issues will be pulled, bank loans recalled, and business activity will sharply decline for lack of funding. The first two of these have certainly started – with a rash of failed issues at the end of June. Will these risks be contained? We don't know.

We don't seriously expect that by some fluke we will identify the tipping point as it happens; that would be too lucky. Yet we feel compelled to share our views on the current situation with you. Clearly we're biased against excessive leverage, and against too much financial ingenuity, too.

That's why we're in the physical gold bullion business. We believe that real physical gold is a sensible insurance against today's increasingly weird financial system. It has been astonishingly reliable in that role in the past.
But this time, who knows?

By Paul Tustain for www.BullionVault.com, the fastest growing gold bullion service online

Friday, 3 August 2007

US subprime turbulence may be contagious -Stiglitz

SINGAPORE, Aug 2 - The turbulence in the U.S. subprime mortgage market could spread to other sectors of the economy, especially as growth momentum is already weak, Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World Bank, said on Thursday.

Financial markets have been volatile in recent weeks amid jitters about the fallout from the problems with U.S. subprime mortgages, but Stiglitz said the turmoil was no surprise to him.

The risks could spread to sectors "wider than the subprime, but how wide is difficult to tell. It's a broad problem", Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate economist and Columbia University professor, told Reuters in Singapore.

"It's very hard to predict the stock markets, but in terms of the underlying weakness of the U.S. economy, that's going to continue for an extended period of time," he said.

"It's a constant source of wonder to me how the market is irrational about certain things that seem so forecastable."

Stiglitz told a financial forum that a stronger Chinese yuan would not resolve the huge U.S. trade deficit, because the world's largest economy would buy consumer goods from other emerging countries if Chinese exports lost their competitiveness.

"You cannot blame America's problem on China. In fact, it's not going to affect the U.S. trade deficit at all if China appreciates its currency," he said.

While shipping cheap goods to the United States, China has been financing the U.S. trade gap by investing most of its foreign exchange reserves in U.S. Treasuries, which in turn helps keep U.S. interest rates low and supports the U.S. economy.

A rapid rise in the yuan's value would make imported farm products cheaper and hit Chinese farmers, he said.

"That's one of the reasons that Chinese leaders have been very resistant to rapid appreciation of their currency."

He said the weakness of the dollar against major currencies might persuade some developing countries to channel more of their reserves into the euro.

Stiglitz, a long-time critic of the failures of globalisation, said many developing countries in Africa and Latin America had failed to benefit from the process of economic integration.

" East Asia took advantage of globalisation and made globalisation in their own terms and that led to successes."

With Added Risks, Avoid Low-Priced Stocks

Low-priced stocks -- those trading below $10 a share or even below $15 -- are often deemed bargains, but they should be avoided.

To some investors, the idea of owning 1,000 shares of a $5 stock sounds a lot better than buying 50 shares of a $100 issue.

But don't dwell on the number of shares owned. It's the return on the amount invested that matters.

Investors are usually better off buying higher-priced stocks, which are really a proxy for higher-quality companies.

The phrase "you get what you pay for" applies in most things in life, as well as in the world of stocks. There's a reason why a Lexus commands a larger price tag than a Ford Focus.

Also, you should realize that low-priced stocks have certain risks.

Many of them are thinly traded, making them prone to wild swings.

Motion systems maker Allied Motion Technology has a 50-day average volume of about 8,500 shares.

With such light interest, the bid-ask spread can be significantly bigger than a more-liquid counterpart.

And the stock can be more easily manipulated by a few large orders.

Making an informed decision on lower-priced stocks can be tougher. Many of these are companies that don't have long track records or much background written about them.

For some, you can't find analyst coverage or earnings estimates. Some are so small or obscure, they don't even have their own Web site.

Then there's something else lacking in cheap stocks -- institutional ownership. Stocks need mutual funds, pension funds and other major investors to support them and bid them higher.

Armed with billions of dollars, these professional investors tend to pass over cheap stocks for higher-priced, better-quality merchandise.

Professionals also can't buy big positions in lower-priced issues without running up the stock's price.

Lastly, a company's share price may be cheap for a reason. It's business may be heading south.

Autobytel, an online provider of car ads, lost money in fiscal 2005 and '06. It's slated to repeat that this year and next. The stock is now around 3.50 a share, well off its record high of 58 back in 1999.

Instead of trying to get a bargain, investors should focus on stocks priced at 15 or higher.

Eliminate the added risks of cheap stocks by investing in liquid issues -- those with average daily trading volumes of at least 100,000 shares.

Your buy candidates should also have a strong record of earnings and sales growth.

And, of course, you want to see that the big guns are with you. Seek stocks with solid institutional ownership.

Bear in mind that a low-priced stock is not necessarily the same thing as what a value investor would consider cheap.

Stocks trading at relatively low price-to-earnings ratios are considered good bets by value investors.

But research shows market winners are usually at high valuations, even before they make their most impressive run-ups.

Seeking a Financial Refuge

By Dean Foust and Lauren Young

The easy-money mindset that pervaded everything from subprime mortgages to private equity has faded, leaving many Wall Street watchers fearful of a credit crunch that might take down the economy. So how can you protect your portfolio?

While most money managers think the broader markets and the economy will ride out the choppiness, they suggest some defensive moves until things settle down. Of the dozens of top managers surveyed by BusinessWeek, many were trimming back their stock exposure in certain areas, boosting their cash holdings, and heading to safer ground with higher-quality bonds. "We just told our people this is no time to be a hero," says David Darst, chief investment strategist for Morgan Stanley's Global Wealth Management Group, who recently raised his recommended cash position a couple of percentage points to 13%. Here's a look at how the smart money is playing the market:

Stocks

Most advisers say they've trimmed their recommended equity stakes for conservative investors from, say, 55% to 50%. Meanwhile, they're shifting out of small and midsize companies and into such multinationals as General Electric (GE), Coca-Cola (KO), and Caterpillar (CAT). Right now, the bigger stocks are a bigger bargain. After the recent turbulence, the price-earnings ratio for the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index, based on profit estimates for the next 12 months, has dropped to 15.3, its lowest level since 1995.

And large companies like GE deliver steady growth and stand to profit from the dollar's ongoing slide, which makes exports more competitive. "If you are really in the business of thoughtfully growing capital, boring is good," says Thomas P. Melcher, chief investment officer at Hawthorn, a wealth management unit of PNC Financial Services Group.

Still, not all boring blue chips are automatically a buy. Financials are especially risky, given the sector's troubles. Consumer discretionary stocks are also vulnerable if heavily indebted Americans pare back their spending. Sectors like health care, software, and industrials make the most sense, say experts. "This is the type of marketplace where quality dominates," says Walter V. Gerasimowicz, CEO of Meditron Asset Management, which manages $600 million.

Bonds

After a long stretch during which investors chased the bigger yields offered by risky plays, there's now a flight to quality in fixed income as well. But many pros say they're bypassing traditional Treasurys -- the benchmark 10-year bond is yielding just 4.79% -- in favor of corporate bonds with good credit and yields above 6%. And since there isn't much difference in the rates between short-term and long-term bonds, they're sticking with investments that mature within two to five years. "You're not getting enough yield to extend out to 30 years," says Mark Kiesel, an executive vice-president at bond giant PIMCO.

Investment-grade bank loans also look appealing. The group has gotten smeared along with the junkier segment in the recent credit squeeze, so many such loans now yield a fat 9%. But they're less risky than many corporate bonds since investors are paid off first in the event of default. Financial planner Morris Armstrong's top picks among bank loan funds: the Oppenheimer Senior Floating Rate Fund and Hartford Floating Rate Loan Fund.

Hedged Bets

If you want a little insurance against a full-on downturn, you can buy put options on the major indexes or a fund that bets on falling stocks. Matthew McCall, president of Penn Financial Group, is putting a slice of his clients' assets into the UltraShort Financials ProShares, an exchange-traded fund that's designed to go up when financials fall. He's also adding Ultra-Short Consumer Services ProShares, another ETF, because as he sees it, it pays to be prepared.

Markets slide as US property fears spread

Singapore stocks shed 116 points in face of troubling news from US credit markets

(SINGAPORE) Stock markets around the world plunged yesterday following sharp losses in US equities on Tuesday, as the problems which began in the subprime mortgage market there continued to infect other parts of the financial markets.

The Straits Times Index fell 115.95 points or 3.3 per cent to end at 3,431.71, the lowest since May2.

In Australia, shares declined by more than 3 per cent, as reports said that two funds managed by Macquarie Bank, Australia's largest securities firm, were facing losses of up to A$300 million due to US subprime mortgage exposure.

Meanwhile, US investment bank Bear Stearns stopped investors from withdrawing money from another of its funds. Two of its other funds nearly collapsed in June after suffering massive losses linked to subprime mortgages.

Fears that the problems have now spread to the wider markets fuelled the bout of selling yesterday.

There's currently a flight to safety caused by more troubling news in the US credit markets,' said economist David Cohen at Action Economics.

Rising defaults and delays on payments by homeowners in the United States have led to losses by hedge funds and banks investing in securities backed by these payments.

This has in turn driven up borrowing costs for companies and buyout funds, as creditors tighten conditions for lending and investors shy away from new debt issues.

Low-cost debt has played a large part in financing private equity buyouts of public-listed firms in recent months. Speculation surrounding the deals and other potential targets has in turn driven up share prices in major markets.

Fears about how wide the subprime contagion has spread is now unsettling investors worldwide.

'No one knows where the ultimate subprime risk resides so investors across the globe are ducking for cover,' Simon Carter, head of North American equities at Aegon Asset Management in Edinburgh, told Bloomberg. Some of them hit the panic button yesterday.

In Japan, the Nikkei-225 index fell 2.2 per cent, while Hong Kong's Hang Seng Index fell 3.2 per cent. China's indices in Shanghai and Shenzhen both lost 3.8 per cent, while South Korea's Kospi index dived 4 per cent.

In South-east Asia, the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index ended 2.5 per cent lower, while key indices in Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines also lost more than 2 per cent.

In Europe too, shares got off to a weak start, with London's FTSE-100 index trading 1.5 per cent lower at noon in the UK.

Mr Cohen said Asian investors would now be looking to see if the turmoil in the financial markets would dampen consumer confidence in the US, which would in turn affect demand for Asian exports. 'That's clearly the biggest concern right now.'

But economic fundamentals around the region and the world have been 'very solid', he added.

Kevin Scully, managing director of NetResearch Asia, said he expects to see more selling in the stock market here in the next few days, forced by margin calls. 'I think it's a good correction back to fundamentals.'

Jimmy Koh, United Overseas Bank's head of economics and treasury research, said financial markets were adjusting for a global repricing of credit risk.

'This is an issue of confidence. Once the dust settles, it's important to note that the fundamentals have not been eroded.'

The current sell-off would create a 'cleaner, more robust' financial system, he said.


Top investor sees U.S. property crash

By Elif Kaban

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Commodities investment guru Jim Rogers stepped into the U.S. subprime fray on Wednesday, predicting a real estate crash that would trigger defaults and spread contagion to emerging markets.

"You can't believe how bad it's going to get before it gets any better," the prominent U.S. fund manager told Reuters by telephone from New York.

"It's going to be a disaster for many people who don't have a clue about what happens when a real estate bubble pops.

"It is going to be a huge mess," said Rogers, who has put his $15 million belle epoque mansion on Manhattan's Upper West Side on the market and is planning to move to Asia.

Worries about losses in the U.S. mortgage market have sent stock prices falling in Asia and Europe, with shares in financial services companies falling the most.

Some investors fear the problems of lenders who make subprime loans to people with weak credit histories are spreading to mainstream financial firms and will worsen the U.S. housing slowdown.

"Real estate prices will go down 40-50 percent in bubble areas. There will be massive defaults. This time it'll be worse because we haven't had this kind of speculative buying in U.S. history," Rogers said.

"When markets turn from bubble to reality, a lot of people get burned."

The fund manager, who co-founded the Quantum Fund with billionaire investor George Soros in the 1970s and has focused on commodities since 1998, said the crisis would spread to emerging markets which he said now faced a prolonged bear run.

"When you have a financial crisis, it reverberates in other financial markets, especially in those with speculative excess," he said.

"Right now, there is huge speculative excess in emerging markets around the world. There will be a lot of money coming out of emerging markets.

"I've sold out of emerging markets except for China," said Rogers, long a prominent China bull.

Even in China, the world's fastest expanding economy, Rogers said stocks were overvalued and could go down 30-40 percent.

But he added: "China is one of the few countries in the world where I'm willing to sit out a 30-40 percent decline."

The last stock market bubble to burst was the dot-com craze which sparked a crash from March 2000 to October 2002.

When the last bubble burst in Japan, said Rogers, stock prices went down 85 percent despite the country's high savings rate and huge balance of payment surplus.

"This is the end of the liquidity party," said Rogers. "Some emerging markets will go down 80 percent, some will go down 50 percent. Some will most probably collapse."

Thursday, 2 August 2007

S&P warns of rising number of sub-investment grade firms

SINGAPORE : Ratings agency Standard & Poor's (S&P) has warned that there is a rising number of Asian companies that are below investment grade.

It said investors need to price in the risks associated with such lower-rated firms.

With excess liquidity in the region, more investment money is flowing towards companies with a higher risk of defaulting on loans.

S&P said 51% of the 367 companies it rated in Asia this year were below investment grade.

This compared to 44% just a year and a half ago.

It expects the number of such companies to increase.

"We are seeing lower-rated entities coming into the market when financing was easy. Now, there might be a change in risk appetite and we're likely to see some liquidity concerns especially in financially vulnerable entities. Therefore, we are expecting defaults to increase, especially from sub-investment grade," said Ping Chew, Managing Director (Asia), Corporate & Government Ratings, Standard & Poor's.

The stock market was jittery on Wednesday and S&P said it welcomes the correction.

It said the sell-off reprices risks, serving as a reminder that lower-rated firms are seen as riskier because they will have to pay higher interest rates or face bankruptcy when the money flow tightens.

But on the other hand, there are analysts who said investors should not be overly focused on company ratings in emerging economies.

Said Arjuna Mahendran, chief investment strategist at Credit Suisse: "Even though their debt is still graded as sub-prime or sub-investment grade, their financial credit worthiness has improved spectacularly. And as a consequence, you'll find that a lot of so-called "sub-investment" grade debt is not in my view sub-investment. These borrowers are extremely creditworthy.

"So I don't see any problem for the growth of sub-investment grade debt in the months and years ahead. We're just seeing a little bout of risk aversion right now, where heavy concentration on sub-prime mortgages in the US has led to fears of excessive exposure to certain financial institutions and lenders."

Credit Suisse expects concerns over sub-prime mortgages in the US to blow over by September, when affected lenders take the hit or close shop. - CNA /ls

Why stocks can shake off mortgage meltdown

Turmoil in the credit markets is sparking a global sell off, but are investors overreacting?

LONDON (CNNMoney.com) -- The threat of a broad credit crunch has jittery investors rushing for the exits, but those concerns may be overdone.

Problems in the risky debt and subprime mortgage sector have sparked wild swings in the market recently - these days few bat an eye at 100 point-plus drops and gains on the Dow Jones industrial average.

Investors have been rattled by a wave of credit woes that has hit leveraged buyouts and the mortgage sector. The worry is that a tightening of credit will have a broader impact on consumers and the economy.

here are reasons for concern. said Tuesday lenders had cut off its access to credit and that it may have to sell off its assets. The collapse of companies like American Home and other mortgage lenders could make home loans more expensive for borrowers.

And after two years of rapid-fire deal making, the buyout boom is facing a lull. As a debt crunch starts to squeeze private equity firms, the boost take-private deals have provided for stocks could start to crumble.

Uncertainty about how wide credit problems will spread is likely to persist, which means investors are in for more sharp swings in the market. But there are a number of reasons why stocks aren't likely to fall off a cliff, analysts say.

Stock valuations are reasonable For one, stocks aren't too pricey and sell offs are likely to bring in buyers looking for a bargain.

"A lot of stocks are looking reasonably cheap," said Peter Dixon, strategist at Commerzbank in London. "On the basis of valuations, you've got to continue to favor equities," he said.

In the U.S., the S&P 500 index is valued at about 15 times 2008 earnings, which makes stocks attractive investments, according to Stephen Leeb, president of New York-based Leeb Capital Management.

Deals not doomed Private equity buyouts have helped support the stock rally in the U.S. and Europe as investors have bet that nearly any public company could be taken over.

The outlook for these deals is looking murky as buyout firms face hurdles securing financing, but a slowdown in leveraged buyouts isn't going to have a substantial impact on stocks.

"The exit of private equity is not going to be what caps this market. There are lots of corporate buyers out there willing to step up to the plate and fill the gaps left by private equity," Leeb said.

Economy still fundamentally strong Turmoil in the credit markets is being caused by a repricing of risk, and not from problems stemming from the broader economy, many say.

"In our opinion this is a financial market event rather than a real economy event," said John Ip, senior economist for Morley Fund Management in London.

As a result, highly leveraged companies and financial firms are likely to feel the pain. But so far, it doesn't look like the upheaval is affecting the ability of companies on sound footing to get credit, he said.

Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson said Wednesday that the fallout from subprime problems was contained and that the global economy remains strong, Reuters reported.

In a sign of the strength of the worldwide economy, the International Monetary Fund last week revised its global growth forecast for 2007 and 2008 to 5.2 percent, up from a previous forecast of 4.9 percent.

Plenty of cash out there Despite problems roiling the debt markets, liquidity - or the amount of money available for investing - remains plentiful worldwide.

China and Russia, for example, have accumulated massive reserves. The global economic boom has also helped drive corporate profits, and many companies are sitting on loads of cash.

"Liquidity is quite abundant and it will cushion the world's economy and the financial markets against the current turmoil," Tony Crescenzi, chief bond market strategist at Miller Tabak and Co. in New York, wrote in a note this week

The tumult in the credit market may persist for some time, but it's likely that "credit formation will return to levels sufficient to power a continuation of the global economic expansion," he wrote.

GIC ready for possible dark clouds despite bright economic outlook

SINGAPORE : It is a Goldilocks global economy now — not too hot, not too cold, but just right — according to some economists, and the bears have not come home, yet.

On Tuesday, Dr Tony Tan named three dark clouds — or bears — on the horizon that have caught the attention of the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC).

First, the economy might get hot if the price of oil, now $70 per barrel, reaches $100 per barrel as some have predicted. "What this will do to inflation is a worry," said Dr Tan, who is the GIC deputy chairman and executive director.

Secondly, the economy could cool if a tightening of credit is caused by the crisis in the United States sub-prime market, where up to 2.2 million people are at risk of forfeiting their homes.

"If that's the case, the sea of liquidity, which is a rising tide lifting up the prices of all assets, may be dampened," said Dr Tan, speaking to reporters after a GIC event.

The third risk is that of an external shock, such as a large terrorist attack or an avian flu epidemic. "The prices which people are buying assets (at) can only be justified if things continue to do well, earnings continue to increase. But if the world is hit by an exogenous shock... then prices can decline as quickly as they've risen, as we've seen in 2003 (when Sars struck)," he said.

The Dow Jones industrials dropping almost 500 points last week, affecting other markets, is an example of the slight "turmoil" that is "of concern to everyone", he added.

For its part, the GIC, "a conservative investor", has taken "necessary precautions" against any kind of risk. "If banks start to tighten up, this will cause difficulties for all investors. GIC is always on the watch for this and to take steps," Dr Tan said.

The GIC, which manages more than US$100 billion ($151.1 billion) of Singapore's foreign reserves, has earned an 8.2 per cent annual return in Singapore dollars since its inception in 1981.

As a sovereign wealth fund, there is a developing issue GIC also must consider: The increasing number of countries establishing similar funds. "If it were only a few countries — Singapore, Abu Dhabi — who have sovereign wealth funds, we would not be particularly worried," said Dr Tan.

But with more of these funds, the impact on the global financial system and international fund flows is an issue that requires "a lot of thought and discussion".

He added: "Singapore has a stake in having an open global system, where funds can flow freely. Other governments, I'm sure, will want the same. The last thing we want is protectionism developing in another form."

Last week's £5.4-billion ($16.5-billion) investment in Britain's Barclays by Temasek Holdings and the state-owned China Development Bank sparked concerns in some quarters about the level of transparency that sovereign investors exercise.

Dr Tan also announced the establishment of a GIC school that will provide a coherent structure for training and development of its staff in portfolio management.

The GIC also welcomed 17 graduates from Singapore, Canada, China, India and the United Kingdom, who have completed its inaugural one-year foundational portfolio management programme and will now be assigned to various investment areas.

Time to Sell Stocks?

No one can time the stock market, but Steve Leuthold has a better forecasting record than most -- and he recently turned bearish. It's okay to sell some stocks, but don't overdo it. Better yet, move to higher-quality stocks and bonds.

After the market closed on July 17, with Standard & Poor's 500-stock index approaching yet another record, strategist Steve Leuthold issued a "sell" recommendation to clients. His Minneapolis-based market research and money-management firm lowered the percentage of exposure to stocks in its portfolios to 30%.

Leuthold conceded in the memo that he felt odd. "We must admit it is unusual and somewhat strange to ... shift to negative at the same time almost all stock market indices are recording new highs and the global economy is stronger." Indeed, the indicators surprised him and his colleagues so much that they waited a week and rechecked the data before issuing the memo.

A few days later, Leuthold looked like a genius. It's not the first time. Leuthold called the start of the current bull market almost five years ago with stunning accuracy. Other accomplishments in a long career include getting clients out of stocks before the 1987 market crash, when the Dow Jones industrial average plunged nearly 23% on a single day.

No, he's not perfect. He incorrectly advised investors in 2005 to cut back their stock weightings to 30% of assets -- only to later change his mind when the market continued to rise.

But his record has been so good that I consider him my favorite market strategist. Unlike low-rent market timers, Leuthold doesn't just look at a few bits of market data -- such as the market's momentum or interest rates or investor sentiment. Instead, he examines more than 180 factors. And he doesn't restrict himself to technical indicators, such as the direction of the market or the numbers of advancing and declining stocks. Leuthold also looks at fundamental factors, such as how expensive stocks are based on earnings, as well as data on the economy, interest rates and inflation.

For many months, Leuthold has been concerned that economic growth was slowing, that interest rates and inflation were headed higher and that investors were too optimistic. When investors are mainly optimistic about stocks, the thinking goes, the market has nowhere to go but down because everyone who was planning to buy already has. "Name me one pundit who was bearish?" challenges Chuck Zender, a senior analyst with Leuthold. "There weren't any bears anymore except the perma-bears."

The final piece was market breadth. That is, even as the indexes were setting records, fewer and fewer stocks were making new highs and the ratio of advancing stocks to declining stocks was falling. "There were really only about 250 stocks going up before this correction -- and nothing else," Zender says.

What's next for the market? If Leuthold is right, the next step is a bear market but not a catastrophic one. On average, the stock market suffers a bear market -- defined as a drop of 20% in major indexes, such as the S&P 500 -- every four or five years. During an average bear market, the S&P loses about 25% of its value. It usually takes 11 to 18 months for the market to hit bottom.

Every generation, investors suffer a cataclysmic bear market. In both the 1973-74 and 2000-02 bear markets, stocks plunged almost 50%. During the Great Depression, the market was down 89% at its worst.

But Leuthold expects the declines to be tempered this time around. First, stocks aren't ridiculously overpriced, as they were in early 2000. And although economic growth appears to be slowing, the most recent figure on the pace of expansion showed the economy to be quite healthy, thank you (gross domestic product expanded 3.4% in the second quarter). "Besides, we just had one of those big bear markets," Zender says.

What should you do?

First off, take any market prognostication with several large grains of salt. In a note to clients penned just before the selloff, Harold Evensky, a financial planner in Coral Gables, Fla., laid out a laundry list of reasons why stocks should decline, then said he wasn't selling.

His reasoning: "We believe successful market timing is significantly less likely to succeed than picking the winning lottery number. Why are we such skeptics? A long history of research has demonstrated that markets not only drop precipitously, they also recover quickly. Market timers must make not one, but two accurate predictions. A timer not only has to be correct in determining when to exit, he or she must also correctly time re-entry."

I couldn't have said it better. Still, Leuthold has a terrific record, and I wouldn't dismiss his forecasts out of hand. So, I wouldn't argue vociferously if you wanted to sell 10% or so of your stocks and move the proceeds into a money-market fund for a time.

As for me, I'm not selling anything. But I already have rearranged my portfolio -- and again urge you to do the same. I've cut stocks of small companies to 10% or less of my stock investments and raised my stake in stocks of large companies. It's common sense; most large companies are a lot better equipped than small companies to face economic and market turmoil. Among large companies, those that exhibit relatively strong growth are more attractive than value stocks. I'm also keeping 25% to 30% of my stock money in foreign stocks.

My favorite large-cap growth funds include Vanguard Primecap Core and Marsico Growth. Use Selected American Shares, despite its huge weighting in financial stocks, for the less-growthy part of your big-cap allocation. Dodge & Cox International Stock remains the best-looking foreign stock fund.

There's no room for low-quality bonds in my investments. High-quality municipal bonds, such as those in Vanguard Intermediate-Term Tax Exempt are ideal. And there's nothing wrong with sticking some cash in a money-market fund.

Don't expect to make money in a bear market this way, but you'll almost certainly lose less than you would by owning riskier fare. And if Leuthold turns out to be dead wrong, as he was in 2005, I think you'll do just fine with the same group of funds.

Steven T. Goldberg is an investment adviser and freelance writer.

Huge Opportunity in "Anti-Risk"

By Russel Kinnel

Jeremy Grantham says he's spotted the third great investing opportunity of his career. The first was small caps in the 1970s. The second was real estate, Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities, and value stocks during the tech bubble in 2000. Before you get too excited, I should make clear that the main opportunity today, in Grantham's view, is getting out of the way and watching the markets plummet in what he calls a slow-motion train wreck. Grantham made this call in a report published July 25--a day before the Dow got 300 points sliced off the top (talk about instant gratification!).

Grantham's firm, GMO, runs mostly institutional mutual funds but also runs half of Vanguard U.S. Value and all of Evergreen Asset Allocation . Grantham has always had a bearish tilt, so I typically take his warnings with a grain of salt. Still, he has been very much on the money with his warnings about the S&P 500 in 2000 and recommendations of foreign small caps, emerging markets, and timber.

In Grantham's view, we are in a financial-debt-soaked bubble that he's labeled the Blackstone Peak. Real estate and bonds are wobbly, and equities may weaken in October 2008. Grantham is a big believer in election cycles, which essentially means that the government floods the economy with money to get itself re-elected and then the market has a big hangover the following year when the bill comes due.

Grantham says that the excesses of private equity, hedge funds, and subprime debt mean lots of the economy and markets are leveraged to the gills and the end won't be pretty. He posits that in five years half the hedge funds will be out of business and one major bank will go belly up. The first call isn't really that bold when you consider the survivorship rates of hedge funds, but the second is a whopper.

I asked him about that, and he explained that he expects big banks to get burned by loaning money to private equity for a low return. He figures they'll get stuck with a few of those loans and take a bath. Moreover, he points out that most financial crises take down at least one big player.

Grantham calls this new opportunity "anti-risk." He says the opportunity lies more in bonds than stocks. "The ideal way of playing this third great opportunity is perhaps to create a basket of a dozen or more different anti-risk bets, for to speak the truth, none of us can know how this unprecedented risk bubble with its new levels of leverage and new instruments will precisely deflate. Some components, like subprime and junk bonds, may go early, and some equity risk spreads may go later."

Grantham's quarterly letter doesn't go into a lot of detail on what those dozen anti-risk bets should be, but he does express a love for TIPS. Given the substantial risk of inflation over the next 10 years, Grantham figures a yield of 2.4% to 2.6% on TIPS would make them attractive. "So, in recent weeks with TIPS selling between 2.6% and 2.8%, we have that rarest of rare birds, a genuinely cheap asset. Needless to say, where appropriate we have been grateful buyers."

Grantham also says he plans to sell his emerging-markets stocks near the end of the year.

I asked Grantham what else individual investors could do to make some anti-risk bets of their own. The wagers he's making for clients are too complicated for individuals, but he did offer a few ideas in addition to buying TIPS.

* Hold a lot of cash so that you'll have plenty of dry powder to take advantage of cheaper markets in years to come.

* Regular bonds are not too bad to own. (This means core high-quality bonds, such as corporate or Treasury bonds.)

* Short the Russell 2000 and go long on the S&P 500.

The final notion reflects Grantham's view that low-quality small caps will be terrible after many years of outperformance and high-quality large caps will fare well after years of lagging. The S&P 500 isn't a perfect proxy for GMO's definition of high quality, but it's close. Grantham notes that 80% of the companies they consider high quality are in the United States. "If the economy weakens substantially, these stocks will be pure gold," he said. You can see the names GMO considers high quality in the portfolio of GMO U.S. Quality. Unfortunately, you can't buy that fund unless your name is CalPERS.

Grantham's view that real estate and junk bonds are a bad place to be isn't unique. Quite a few savvy investors have sounded the warning on these apparently overheated asset classes. In fact, Morningstar's own REIT analysts have a dim view of their prospects. However, Grantham stands out in his predictions for the breadth and depth of the sell-off. In addition, I haven't heard a lot of people pounding the table for TIPS.

It's an interesting argument and Grantham, like most thoughtful bears, provides a valuable service in challenging bullish assumptions. Will I bail out on everything but TIPS? No, though I already have gotten out of my high-yield and real-estate funds for some of the same reasons spelled out above. In addition, I already have lots of blue-chip exposure. I might raise my TIPS weighting a percentage point or two, though.

In fact, GMO's funds aren't entirely bailing on markets either, as they typically have tight constraints. The Evergreen Asset Allocation portfolio is instructive. It's out of small caps but has plenty of exposure to core bonds and stocks as well as TIPS and emerging markets.

As Stock Market Slides Into A Correction, Check For Key Sell Signals

The market is in a correction, so it's more important than ever to review CAN SLIM sell rules.

Most of those involve specific chart action, which has sprouted in recent weeks among many high-rated stocks -- even before Thursday's meltdown.

Let's review how daily and weekly charts help investors decide when it's time to dump a position.

High-volume selling. Watch out for increases in volume without increases in price, or declines in heavy trading.

Closing at or near day's lows. This is a sign of weakness, showing that buyers could not prevail over sellers. Stocks that reverse lower from highs, giving up earlier gains, are another form of this flagging action. Palomar Medical peaked in exactly this way (point 1). A single day of this type of weakness may not be worrisome, but a string of such days certainly bears watching.

New highs on low volume. This suggests institutional investors have lost their interest in the stock. The trend can show up on daily or weekly charts.

Climax tops. If a stock has climbed for many months and suddenly charges ahead for one or two weeks at a much faster rate, it's probably topping.

This happened to most market leaders in March and April 2000, when a bear market began.

Look for a surge of 25% to 50% in one to three weeks, or largest one-day price gain since the beginning of the stock's entire run-up. Also a red flag is when a stock forms its largest weekly price spread since the start of its move.

Late-stage breakouts. Sell most stocks breaking out of a fourth-stage base. Few leaders can make any meaningful progress -- and many peak -- after they're gone that far into their advances.

Drops below key support levels. Sell a stock that plunges below its 10-week moving average on huge volume, especially if it stays below the line for several weeks. This is especially true for stocks that have found support at their 10-week lines during their climbs from a breakout.

When Is It Time To "Worry" About Our Investments?

So when is it time to worry about our investments? We believe that in the short term it is very difficult to know when an investment will stop or start rising in a new general trend, but long term we think an assets value and therefore investment potential is much easier to estimate. In our every day world, we think there are many signs that the market is likely over valued and likely a good time to “worry” about ones investment. When we list our examples, try to imagine recent bubbles such as “The New Economy,” 1990’s “dot-com” debacle or arguably the recent “real-estate bubble.” Remember, if everyone is involved and “in-love” with a particular investment, who is left to buy?

Signs of overvaluation:

  1. Wide spread acceptance of the investment by the general public.

  2. Wide spread participation in the investment by the general public.

  3. An accepted rationalization as to why this particular investment can not go down. Examples: “New Economy”, “They aren’t making any more land”, “Everyone needs somewhere to live” etc.

  4. Mega book stores displaying many best selling books on how to make money in the current most popular investment of the time. Think back to mutual fund books in the 90’s and real-estate books of the 2000’s.

  5. Television shows as well as entire networks devote topics to a popular investment such as “flipping homes,” “renovating homes,” “buying homes,” etc.

  6. Late night television infomercials selling the easy get rich quick method of making money in the current most popular investment.

  7. Popular talk shows featuring a professional advising the public to get involved with his simple “can’t lose” investment plan.

  8. Conversations at social gatherings revolving around the current most popular investment with outrageous success stories.

  9. Stock charts that relentlessly climb higher and higher without the much needed healthy pull backs and seasonal corrective patterns.

  10. Investors quit their “day job” to seek out new fortunes by investing in the popular investment class.

  11. Nightly news casts and special features on how well the investment market is doing and how much money is being made.

  12. A huge increase in small startup companies looking to capitalize on the craze.

In our opinion the real world indicators of an investments over valuation is everywhere. The key is to recognize a generally over or undervalued investment and invest accordingly. The above indicators are not perfect investing signals but they are warning signs that should tell an investor to pay close attention.

We keep ourselves in the right frame of mind for making investment decisions by following a set of general rules and principles, a predetermined investment system and custom built market timing charts. Our rules and principles help us remember signs of over valuation, normal market action, investor psychology etc. It is our system and our custom built charts that helps us invest in silver and gold with the intention of capitalizing on what we think is a long term major trend. This is how we keep the “worry” out of investing.

Liquidity Crisis Hits Markets and Gold

By Chris Laird

For the last several years, corporate buyouts, corporate stock buy backs and such, the Yen carry trade, and the mortgage derivatives markets have added tremendous liquidity to world financial markets. In tandem with this, the market analysts came to view a ‘world stock bull’ emerging, and even the most conservative market bears started to get into this world stock bull theme in their writings. The total amount of these sources of financing and liquidity in the last 2 years is over $5trillion, and has been one of the major supports for stock markets.

All of a sudden, these sources of liquidity are vanishing so fast, that market experts are amazed. This all came together in about 3 or 4 weeks after the Bear Stearns mortgage derivatives mess revealed how illiquid structured finance (derivatives in mortgages and such) can become – instantaneously. After that, investors started to flee from billions of dollars value of structured finance offerings in the last several weeks, and in the blink of an eye, almost the entire derivatives financing universe lost liquidity across the board. This is a prime cause of the latest world stock crashes.

Right now, virtually all sources of liquidity are drying up faster than anyone would have thought. Or, put another way, with corporate buy outs and stock buybacks at over $1 trillion in the last year alone – that is now almost gone as support for the markets. Investment banks such as Morgan and Goldman have had to park about 40 huge deals planned this year, as they have not been able to sell of the bonds and financing for these deals. This picture emerged in only about 3 weeks.

Continuing, the now well known debacle with mortgage derivatives – structured finance packaging risky mortgages into so called AAA rated tranches – have led to financial crises at Bear Stearns, Italease, killed deals with Morgan, and Goldman and others, and caused that sector to lose liquidity to zero basically, in a mere two or three weeks after the problems with Bears two now worthless hedge funds emerged. Now, the almost the entire mortgage derivative universe is tanking – and huge margin calls by banks to counter parties are happening- and no one wants to buy.

Then, the long threatening unwinding of the Yen carry trade is afoot, the Yen strengthening significantly now for two weeks, and as that continued apace, world stock markets finally started to fall apart – or crash – this week. Lots of cheap Yen are borrowed at about 1% and invested in every financial market imaginable. As the Yen rises, investors have to sell out stocks and whatever, and then pay back Yen at higher exchange rates – a sure loser. This effect is magnified by a factor of ten by hedge funds who use 10 to 1 or more leverage.

And the list of liquidity drying up goes on, but, only a few weeks after the Bear Stearns CDO (mortgage derivative mess) showed that no one wanted to buy CDOs any more, that rumbled through credit markets, and now, as one trader said, ‘there is a full blown liquidity crisis at hand in world financial markets’. This is not just about CDOs, but has now scared almost the entire structured finance (derivatives) universe because it showed how illiquid they can become- basically instantly illiquid.

And, as, in the case of Bear, or Italease, bankers have to call in loans from counterparties who hold their structured finance derivatives, and find that their counterparties cannot fulfill the ‘margin’ calls in many cases – read as a liquidity crisis.

Then, as this all is occurring, world financial markets are crashing, as the easy liquidity for corporate buyouts and buybacks, and mortgage financing, all of a sudden vanishes in only about 3 weeks. The speed which this liquidity crisis is emerging is amazing many.

Gold suffers because it is sold as a liquid asset by funds and investors to make margin calls among other things. As losses cascade in this latest world stock crash in Asia – down 2 to 4% last night, Europe – down about 2%, the US down 2% or so yesterday, gold (and precious metals) is dragged down with them.

We at Prudent Squirrel have been warning for several months that this was about to occur in the NL and in mid week market alerts. Tuesday this week, we put out an alert that the same factors that led to February 27th crashes were again in place. That warning was prescient. In any case, subscribers were thankful for the warning. Gold and world stock markets plummeted two days later.

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